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Coming in April

An important event coming in April is the 51st annual convention of The Speech Association of the Eastern States, to be held April 7-9 at the Henry Hudson Hotel, New York City.

The April issue of TODAY'S SPEECH will contain articles on "How to Speak Without Notes," by Lionel Crocker, "Fostering Group Thinking," by John K. Brilhart, "Broadcasting's Hidden \$64,000 Question," by William D. Sample, "Emerson's Almost Perfect Orator: Edward Taylor," by Egbert S. Oliver, "The Future Role of Linguistic Science in Speech Education," by William Walter Duncan, "Another Use for Tape Recordings," by Louis J. LaBorwit, "The Need for Speech Therapists," by Bruce Siegenthaler, and "Stevenson and His Audience," by Richard Murphy.

Readers are invited to recommend papers from the SAA Convention they would like to see included.

One Man's Opinion

CONVENTION TIME

Those who were able to attend the annual convention of the Speech Association of America, in Washington, D. C., December 28-30, doubtless agree that it offered one of the most stimulating collections of papers we have heard in many a year. "Why Go to Conventions" is a subject discussed most intriguingly by our own past-president, Dr. J. Calvin Callaghan, on page 10 of this issue. Our own vice-president, Dr. Eleanor M. Luse, of the University of Vermont, is preparing a program that will be at once challenging, informative, and stimulating, for the April Convention of SAES.

Time and date for this 51st annual convention of the SAES is:

Henry Hudson Hotel New York, N. Y. April 7 - 9, 1960

Should you plan to attend? Should you if you do not teach Speech, or if you are not a student of Speech, or if you are outside the geographical area of the Eastern States? Should you attend if you are a business man, or a housewife, or a lawyer, or doctor, or salesman?

In the first place – you are welcome. The Convention is completely open. All that is required is to take out membership in SAES (at \$3.50), which

may be done at the Convention or by writing in advance to Mr. Wiley C. Bowyer, Executive-Secretary of SAES, Mineola Public Schools, Mineola, L. I., New York.

In the second place, if you never attended a Speech Convention, this would be a good time to begin. You will meet many of the leaders in the Speech profession; you will establish acquaintance with fellow workers in Speech from various states and in the course of the years meeting these folks at the Convention will be a prime reason for attending; you will hear many papers presented, rep-presenting a vast amount of work by competent scholars, which will not only increase your knowledge of the field but which also illustrate many diverse methods of research and inquiry. Not wholly incidentally, you will be able to enjoy the resources of New York. Dr. Luse has reserved 100 tickets to the current Broadway hit, "The Miracle Worker," for an SAES theatre party. Music, plays, bookstores, general shops, Radio City's radio and television studios, and the excitement of Times Square are all available as added reasons for putting the SAES Convention on your calendar. We hope that the 1500 in attendance for the Fiftieth Anniversary Convention last year will be surpassed. We think you will be glad if you come.

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(Continued on page 34)

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ADLAI E. STEVENSON:

Part I. Stevenson as Spokesman

by Richard Murphy

Mr. Murphy is Professor of Speech, University of Illinois, and editor of The Quarterly Journal of Speech. Part II, "Stevenson and His Audience," will be published in the next issue. The articles are adapted from remarks in a Stevenson symposium at the SAES Golden Anniversary Convention in New York.

ONE OF THE PHENOMENA OF A FREE SOCIETY is the spokesman, the man who, with something to say, and some skill and persistence in saying it, achieves an influence and prominence quite beyond any office he may hold. The prime example in this decade is Adlai Stevenson. Although he held elective office for only four years, and during the past eight no public office at all, he has a national, and at times, a world audience.

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In considering Stevenson as spokesman, we need larger objectives than are found on a critic's sheet for a beginning course in public speaking. He has explained his purpose. Since 1952, he has been "titular head" of a party, but with "no party office, no staff, no funds," no direct way of shaping his party's policy, and with "no devices such as the British have developed . . . to communicate directly and responsibly with the leaders of the party in power." Yet, the party's candidate for President "is generally deemed the leading spokes-man of his party." Stevenson determined to accept full responsibility as spokesman.

He speaks at college commencements and convocations, at forums, and interviews; he tours the world to collect his details. (This month he is in Latin America.) He has advocated many causes unpopular at the time, but which have since gained in support: presidential and federal leadership rather than force in the Supreme Court decision on integration of schools; revision of the draft; stopping atomic tests; adjudication of Formosa; co-existence with Russia; support of summit con-

In his role as spokesman, Stevenson has gone beyond partisan politics. Here are two examples. He broke a silence of four months, in 1955, to talk over the radio on Matsu and Quemoy, when it looked as though we were at the brink of war with China. In advocating relinquishing the border islands, and turning Formosa over to the United Nations for settlement, he opposed not

only the Republican administration policy, but that of Democratic Senator George, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A period of thoughtful discussion followed his speech. People began looking at maps and speculating about what Chiang was doing on those border islands. At a time when Senator McCarthy was at the height of his power, and it seemed he might prevail, Stevenson spoke to the country. He had often challenged Senator McCarthy, but this time, in a desperate attempt to unite Democratic-Republican bipartisan values, he put the responsibility on McCarthy's party:⁸

Twenty years of bipartisan policy, highly intelligent and highly successful, have been called "Twenty Years of Treason" - under the auspices of the Republican National Committee.

Within a few days, Vice President Nixon talked to the nation in direct reply to Stevenson, and agreed that communism should not be fought in this country by anti-democratic and irresponsible methods. The President, in his press conference, in reply to a question about the Stevenson speech, said that Mr. Nixon and not Senator McCarthy represented his views. That same week, Senator Flanders rebuked Senator McCarthy on the floor of the Senate. The party began to take some responsibility for one of its members, there was a resolution of censure in the Senate, and the end of a man and a period came rather quickly.

The importance of Stevenson's role as spokesman is attested by the number of studies of him made by graduate students. Among Stevenson's contributions to life and letters is his service in supplying rhetorical specimens. Last year four M.A. theses and a Ph.D. dissertation were done on him. Speech Monographs lists fourteen theses and dissertations in the last four years. This figure does not include the current crop. The subject has been very cooperative, has supplied texts and in-

Adlai E. Stevenson, What I Think (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), pp. ix-x. Italies supplied.
 Ibid., pp. 215-224. The speech was given by radio from Chicago, April 11, 1955.

Bid., p. 64. The speech was given at Miami Beach, March 7, 1954.
 This sequence of events is reported in one issue of Time (March 22, 1954), pp. 22, 28.

formation and personal interviews, but has balked at such tasks as describing his typical written and typical spoken style. His courtesy to scholars goes beyond the call of a man not on duty. As evidence of essential thoughtfulness and stylistic care, here is a note in reply to a critic who sent him an article:

Last night I read your piece about my speeches in The Quarterly Journal of Speech . . and I have been unbalanced ever since! That you could have found so much of merit and retained it so well fills me with a craftsman's envy, a politician's confidence and a human being's profound gratitude.

> Cordially yours. Adlai E. Stevenson

Mr. Stevenson is very much aware of criticism of his speaking, we are told by two professors who interviewed him, and gives intense "self-evaluation after every speech." He reports: "I am always depressed." But there are lighter touches in the criticisms, which might give him some amusement and ease his post-prandian depression. One M.A. candidate tried to apply to Stevenson's speeches I. A. Richards' formula for metaphor, and decided the theory couldn't be applied to anybody's metaphers. A Ph.D. candidate made a study of 27 metropolitan newspapers to see how they covered the speeches of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Stevenson in 1952. One of the findings was that 20 of the 27 supported Mr. Eisenhower, that "bias appeared in the tenor of follow-up stories," and that "fuller treatment of audience reactions was given to Eisenhower speeches than to those of Stevenson." This ought to be reassuring evidence to a man who made a rather well known speech, in 1952, "On the One Party Press." Another Ph.D. candidate found his subject fond of bon mots, and noted that in Stevenson they "are artistic, for they are based on partial maxims or disjointed enthymemes." Another Ph.D.-er, comparing the winner and the loser, found Stevenson's pessimism "established . . . (him) as a more conservative person that Eisenhower, although still a liberal in the school of Burke . . . "10 An ambitious Ph.D. candidate, 11 class

of possible 1960, is making a linguistic study of selected written and oral passages in Stevenson, including correlations of actor, actor-verb, adverb, and adverb-verb archetypes. So the studies go.

Before the graduate students are finished, Stevenson will be studied within an inch of his rhetorical life. We know he feels uncomfortable without a prepared speech to work from, that instead of relying on a few set speeches with some local variations, he tries to do a specific speech for each occasion. We know he is his own best speech writer, and if time will permit, he works over his text up to the last moment. An instance of the detail in which he has been observed is the study by Ralph Richardson,12 of a speech made at the Hollywood Bowl in 1954. Stevenson is traced from the time he left Denver, through his weary attempts until 4:30 a.m. to get his speech finished despite callers, and through the actual delivery. Reproduced are pages of the original handwritten manuscript, the final typescript with pencilled annotations, and the taped recording version. There were eighty-two instances of overt audience response, and the eve-contact was checked at seventyfive per cent.

Since 1952, Stevenson has developed remarkably as a speaker. I remember a speech early in his campaign for governor in 1948, when he appeared with Senator Paul Douglas. Stevenson was rather apologetic, somewhat uncertain. It was

Douglas who took the house.

During his term as governor, Stevenson was not considered an orator, although he had some mastery of exposition, as his radio reports to the people showed. The time for greatness came at the 1952 convention, when, in welcoming the delegates to Chicago and to Illinois, he went beyond the occasion, and issued a call to public duty, for which he himself was drafted. During his development as a speaker Stevenson had his moods of seriousness and jest. At one time, it appeared his sense of humor might diminish his stature as a statesman; he was too fond of gags. Today he is criticized for being pessimistic. You who saw him on Edward R. Murrow's Small World Program this year will understand Douglass Cater's phrase, Stevenson's "evangelism of quiet desperation." 18

How can his substance and style be quickly described? Consistently, he has weight of idea.

pp. 78-82.

Raymond Yeager, "A Rhetorical Analysis of the 1952 Presidential Campaign Speeches of Adlai Ewing Stevenson." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1956. Abstracted in Speech Monographs, XXIV (June, 1957), 114-115.

Malcolm O. Sillars, "An Analysis of Invention in the 1952 Presidential Campaign Addresses of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai Estevenson." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1955. Abstracted in Speech Monographs, XXIII (June, 1956), 111, 112

<sup>171-112.
18</sup> Fanny Jane Blankenship, Mount Holyoke College, "A Linguistic Study of Stevenson's Spoken and Written Style."
12 Ralph Richardson, "Adlai E. Stevenson, Hollywood Bowl, October 9, 1954," Western Speech, XIX (May, 1955), 137-174.
18 Douglass Cater, "What Makes Humphrey Run," The Reporter, XX (March 5, 1959), 16.

Eussel Windes, Jr., and James A. Robinson, "Public Address in the Career of Adlai E. Stevenson," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLII (October, 1956), 230.
 Fanny Jane Blankenship, "I. A. Richards' Theory of Metaphor Applied to Selected Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson." M.A. thesis, University of Illinois, 1957.
 Georgia B. Bowman, "A Study of the Reporting by Twenty-Seven Metropolitan Newspapers of Selected Speeches of Adlai Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 Presidential Campaign." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1956. Abstracted in Speech Monographs, XXIV (June, 1957), 101-102.
 Portland, Oregon, September 8, 1952. Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson, 1952 (New York, Random House, 1953), pp. 78-82.

Consistently, he adapts his materials to a fast moving world. In the crisis of Suez, in 1956, he quickly prepared a telecast answer to the President the day following his address. In fifteen minutes he reviewed policy in the Middle East, showed how failures could have been averted, and attacked the administration on various counts – all in fifteen minutes, and about the Middle East, a region his audience probably thought was somewhere around Buffalo, where he gave the telecast. When Theodore Roosevelt was trying to get Taft elected in 1908, he told him "he must treat the political audience as one coming, not to see an etching, but a poster. He must, therefore, have streaks of blue, yellow, and red to catch the eye, and eliminate all fine lines and soft colours."15 Mr. Stevenson presents etchings rather than billboards.

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Mr. Stevenson's style is rich in figurative language. What a shame he was not available to rhetoricians of the nineteenth century, when figures and tropes were studied. "No gains without pains" 16 - that is genus antimetabole, specie annomination, words of similar sound but dissimilar meaning. Sometimes his figures are apt, even brutal: "The Vice-President has put away his switchblade and now assumes the aspect of an Eagle Scout."

Sometimes they are a little mixed: "We should not put too many of our eggs in the atomic and hydrogen basket."18 Sometimes they are a little tired -"reality" is always "stark." Sometimes his best

figures get lost in run-on sentences.

Mr. Stevenson's style is essentially egotistic. In his acceptance speech of 1952, he made 67 references to himself in a short speech. This indicates no lack of humility, but rather a practice of setting his speeches where he, rather than the audience, is on a subject. Of course, he rigorously builds his ethical proof, snatches at every possible connection with his audience, but his speeches are at times essayish in that they grow from his rather than the audience's mood. But he can appeal to community interests in his peroration, in combination of democratic and religious faith.

Mr. Stevenson likes to quote from the Bible, and Emerson and Channing – Unitarian standbys he has known since his days in Sunday school. His recall is stocked with handy literary allusions and anecdotes which he draws upon particularly in times of strong feeling. There is the little Lincoln story, of the boy who stubbed his toe, and who

said it hurt too much to laugh, and he was too big to cry – used as the final lines in his concession of 1952. In the 1956 concession – now a speech form he was becoming accustomed to - there were two allusions not identified in this dispatches until the following day. One was a quotation from "A Christmas Letter" by Fra Giovanni, written in 1513 A.D., "there is radiance and glory in the darkness, could we but see, and to see, we have only to love." The other quotation was "a merry heart doeth good like a medicine, but a broken spirit drieth the bones." The process of memoriter, of filing away passages to be used in emergency, is a classical procedure. His sister tells the story that back in 1952 Stevenson was listening to a radio news commentator criticizing him for making jokes in his speeches. He then quoted the line, "a merry heart," and speculated on its source. He started with Shakespeare, and found it in Proverbs 17:22. Four years later, the quotation was there for use as he painfully wrote his speech in the Blackstone Hotel. Mr. Stevenson's allusions have made even newsmen bibliographers. There was the Christmas card of 1955 with the Confederate soldier's prayer. The trouble Mr. Stevenson took to get his quotation straight that time has been variously reported.30

As to Stevenson's delivery, there is general agreement. At his worst, he is a bit jumpy, nervous, and arouses empathic responses of tension. Not always can one sit back and enjoy his flow of language; you must lean forward to help. At his best, his periods are delivered in a poetic as well as rhetorical mode. Often as I listen to him, I find myself muttering directions about conversational quality as I would in a classroom: "Express the full meaning of your words as you utter them; strive for a lively sense of communication; let yourself respond fully to your meaning and your communication." Mr. Stevenson never had any formal training in speaking. His voice, which in the early days of his first strenuous campaign was of concern to his managers, holds up remarkably well. Not having had a public speaking course in college is something like not having a college degree; you may not have missed much, but you will always suspect you did. Some teachers of speech argue that if Stevenson had had academic work in persuasion and communication, the course of history would have been changed. Who knows? But Mr. Stevenson's relations with his audience is the subject of the second article.

Telecast at Buffalo, November 1, 1956. Adlai E. Stevenson, The New America (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 34-38.
 The Letters of Archie Butt, ed. Lawrence F. Abbott (New York, Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924), pp. 143-144.
 Acceptance speech, July 26, 1952. Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson, 1952 (New York: Random House, 1953), p. 10.
 Minneapolis, November 5, 1956. The New America, p. 39.
 Speech at Chicago, October 15, 1956. Ibid., p. 45.

Elizabeth Stevenson Ives, My Brother Adlai (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1956), p. 169.
 Stevenson saw "A Soldier's Prayer" in Think on These Things by John Ellis Large, Rector, Church of the Heavenly Rest, New York City. Details of Stevenson's attempt to identify the prayer are given in the church's publication, Disciple, VI (February 26, 1956), 4. See also Time (January 2, 1956), p. 13; (February 20), p. 10.

How to Listen Persuasively

by Flora C. Perkins

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A wife of one of those fearsome creatures, a Professor of Speech (Lindsey S., of Brooklyn), Mrs. Perkins has previously shared with us some of her ideas on feminine persuasiveness — a distinct service to all benighted males.

If ALL THE BOOKS WRITTEN about persuasive speaking were laid end to end, quite a number of persons would come up with cricks in the back. Unfortunately, those written about persuasive listening could be carried from Brooklyn to Yonkers during rush hour by even a tired little old lady. This specific shortage of how-to instructions indicates bias, and a shocking lack of consideration for an underprivileged and inarticulate mass.

Subject to sub-division, listening can be divided into two general classes: audience listening and conversational listening. We may shelve the discussion of large audience listening, owing to the fact that the audience undoubtedly exerts very little influence over the platform speaker's opinions, except as they relate directly to its reactions. The audience is "an intelligent one" if it was enthusiastic, or "a herd of doltish yokels" if it went to sleep. On the other hand, conversational listening offers unlimited opportunities to the vigilent member of society for swaying and bending the speaker."

For the number one definition of conversation, nearly all dictionaries list *talk*. It is such a generally pleasing definition that any group sampling finds the majority talking. Those who aren't are merely pausing to get their second wind for a new start. Listening, as an art, has become lost among the mazes of television antennae and radio transmitters. The average American listener, who at first hastened to cut off a speaker with a flick of a switch, now does it with a flick of the mind. (The remote control switch was invented too late.) He is able to carry this ability over into conversational listening with admirable skill.

Conversation implies that a topic of more or less interest is tossed back and forth between, or among, individuals somewhat in the manner of a game of catch-ball. It may be leisurely or animated; one participant may hold on to the ball longer than others, but there must be some exchange. No Autocrat of the Breakfast Table may

take over. He'd better not try, these days, or his friends will teach him a thing or two about ball holding. Modern conversations tend to follow the principles of a Cherokee Indian ball game — even choking is permitted as a means of recovering the ball.

In the early sixteenth century, Niccolo Machia-velli built quite a reputation among his contemporaries and made his name immortal by his knowledge of sharp political finagling. That he was able to talk business successfully with such mercurial characters as Louis XII and Cesare Borgia was due to a talent for listening and to the nicety of his judgment in when to raise or lower his eyebrows while doing it. A "prince" in those ticklish times was fond of the sound of his own voice and moody about listening to others. Not only one's job but one's health often depended on an ability to express an emotion like *doubt* in a diplomatic manner.³

In our streamlined age where we spotlight democracy, affairs sometimes become retarded by the bulk of our "togetherness," resulting in the catastrophe of too many cooks. It is therefore natural that a ubiquitous body called *The Conference* should have developed. No wars can be fought, no inebriating perfume can be christened, no crunchy new cereal can be put on the market, and no Speech Conventions be held without a conference beforehand in which a group of people meet to pool their views on how, why, when, where and sometimes whether it should all be done.

Rare is the conference which gets under way without having present at least one of those breezy fellows possessed of a Napoleon complex and loaded with stupendous, colossal, dynamic plans for getting everything done right in spite of democracy. Not many conferences could survive the impact of such high-voltage personalities if it were not for the quiet manipulations of a few modern Machiavellis. They sit calmly with poised pencils; they frown, they smile, they nod, look grave or stern, and occasionally they speak — briefly. The ultra-action boys never quite know at what point

¹ Although the author feels that it would be more scholarly to state the exact number of workmen and the working hours required to lay the designated speech books end to end, she discarded the idea due to the amount of mathematics involved.

² Such a reactionary statement requires a footnote lest the reader be convinced that he misread the sentence.

Machiavelli's one mistake was in brashly defining "diplomacy" in his later years. It made his name a nasty word.

it was that some of their dearest ideas were killed, or how they themselves came to agree to the

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The modern accent in everyday living is on the casual. Everyday listening is usually pretty casual, too. The following example was selected from real life with only a few minor changes made for the protection of innocent people. The author's opinion is that it illustrates the mutual listening habits of a large percentage of American married couples.

She: (As husband comes in from a long six hours of slaving in an air-conditioned office.) Thank goodness you're home in time for dinner for a change; I've had a perfectly hectic day.

He: I hope you don't think my day has been a picnic! We had another one of those

never-ending conferences.

She: Never-ending! You can say that again! Lana Green called me before I could finish the breakfast dishes. I thought I'd never break it off.

He: Breaking it off isn't easy when the boss is spouting ideas. He doesn't want advice. He just wants to push through some wild scheme while the rest of us poor dopes

cheer from the sidelines.

She: Oh, yes. Both lines broke down while I was hanging out clothes. I'm afraid Johnny was swinging on them. The only way to take care of the situation is to get a dryer.

He: Nothing could dry him up. The way to take care of the situation is to have that big bag of wind swinging at a rope's end.

But hanging's too good for him.

She: Why Henry Jones! Are you crazy? Talking about wanting your own son murdered!
He: Crazy? You're crazy! I don't know what

in the world you think you're talking about!

Et cetera.

Et cetera.

Such a mixed-up marital game of conversational catch can result in no end of confusion, and may eventually lead to courtroom scenes and indignant accusations of incompatibity.

A wife should listen to her husband when he desires to talk, and persuade him by means of her listening. When her lord and master comes home frothing at the mouth over the tilt he has had with the third high in command in his working establishment, it is best to refrain from actual conversation. Small clucking sounds and an expression of deep concern are sufficient. It will encourage

him to describe vehemently, and in gruesome detail, just what measures he will take with that so-an-so if he ever gets him cornered. He will bang on the table and smite the air in demonstration. The wife then can assume an expression of awe at such a display of militancy, slip a hammer into his hand and lead him to the loose closet shelf which she has been trying to get him to drive a few nails into.

If the husband begins a gleeful account of the deal he has just put over, getting the best of those big fellows who were out to get him, and how nobody has a better selling line than he has, she should look admiring, or actually worshipful. By striking while the iron is hot she can give him a push over toward the next door neighbor who was so nasty about that little tiny nick of paint she took off of his old fender when she turned too quickly into the driveway in the afternoon.

Let the man of the house begin to list his accomplishments, and remark that he is doing rather well for himself, the wife should never, never, make a snide reply. She should convey, by her simple, trusting expression and earnest attention, a complete belief in his ability to keep going on up the ladder of success. For now is the time to bring

out that terribly expensive new hat!

The distaff side is accused constantly of being the more vocal, but one may not deliberate such a debatable issue at this time. A problem which is of considerable relevancy to our study is an alarming tendency among intelligent males in our country to by-pass intelligent females and marry those with less impressive I. Q.'s. Sociologists, especially lady sociologists, explain the phenomenon by pointing out that the mores of the times direct the males to make their selections on a figure basis under the label of romantic love. A more practical explanation may be as follows: Bright boy meets bright girl. Both yearn for an ear to bend on the subject, I Am a Very Bright Person. Something ought to give, but doesn't. Finis. Bright boy meets fluffy little dim-wit. She rolls up her girlishly naive eyes and listens adoringly to his masculine maunderings and boastings, while sweet-ly murmuring, "Oh, you're so clever!" It doesn't

It is possible to overdo the listening act, of course. A sad example is cited of one zealous lady who puts her whole heart into an inflexible determination to be a good listener. Her panting eagerness is so unnerving that the glibbest conversationalist goes into a state of shock. Her demeanor calls to mind a large, happy, muddy-pawed St. Bernard

(Continued on page 9)

Unbreakable Rule . . .

by Ralph N. Schmidt

Dr. Schmidt (Ph.D., Syracuse) is Chairman of the Department of Speech at Utica College and, happily, a frequent contributor to our pages.

There is only one rule that holds true one hundred per cent of the time in public speaking — and that is the rule that there is no rule that holds true one hundred per cent of the time!

The rules and maxims with which a good course (or textbook) in public speaking will supply the speaker will be true most of the time. They are of course, general rules, drawn from the experience of successful speakers on hundreds of occasions. They are not, however, specific rules formulated for specific occasions. Blind and rote following of rules will not guarantee truly effective speaking, although it may ensure (in the majority of instances) a competent presentation. A wise adaptability is the only safe policy.

Each speech situation is as unique as a finger print. It can never be exactly duplicated. The factors which will enter into every speech situation are so many and varied that they cannot be completely enumerated. To attempt to do so here would be unthinkable. It is sufficient merely to categorize them in order to understand the uniqueness of each speech situation.

The major classifications of factors entering into the speech situation concern (1) the speaker, (2) the audience, (3) the occasion, (4) the message, (5) the place, (6) the time.

Each one of these is capable of infinite variations and of intricate and complex interrelationships with the others. Temperature, humidity, ventilation may be affected by (1) the place, (2) the time, (3) the audience and will, in turn, affect each of them. In the summer it can be expected that it will be warm and humid and that there will be a need for ventilation if the audience is large. Yet, if the place is air conditioned, this would not be true. If the place is out of doors, there will be no need for ventilation, but it may be warm and humid. Hence, rules applying to summer may or may not be applicable. Whatever affects one of the factors within a classification, affects the rules which would normally apply in that classification.

The attitude of the audience may, perhaps, be favorable toward the speaker, disgusted with itself, antagonistic toward the message. pleased with the place, and indifferent to the significance of the

time (or day). The speaker, also, has attitudes toward each of the other factors. Change any one of his attitudes, or those of the audience, and the task confronting *this* speaker in communicating *this* message to *this* audience changes. The rules to be followed change with each change in the situation.

Let us suppose, for example, that the class of 1950 is holding its tenth reunion. There is a reunion breakfast scheduled before the commencement exercises for the class of 1960. In the afternoon a business meeting is to be held, and in the evening a dinner dance. The theme of the reunion is "Loyalty to Our Alma Mater." A speech is to be presented on this theme at all three of the scheduled sessions.

The audience at all three sessions is the class of 1950. The place at which all three sessions are to be held is the ballroom of the local hotel. All three sessions are on the same day, but at different times during that day. All three sessions have the same occasion, the reunion; but there is a difference in that one is a breakfast, one a business meeting, and one a dinner dance. The theme for each of the three sessions is the same. Ostensibly, any rules pertaining to any one of the three times at which the speech is to be presented would largely hold true for the other two times.

Suppose you were the alumnus asked to make all three speeches. Would you follow the same rules for each of those three speeches? Of course not! Suppose, instead, that you were to make one of the speeches and other illustrious alumni the other two. Would it make a difference to you whether you were to speak at the breakfast, the business session, or at the dinner preceding the dance? Would you prepare one speech and be willing to draw lots with the other two alumni for the speaking time? Of course you wouldn't! You would want to know at which session you were to speak so that you could prepare for that particular time within the occasion.

Let us be even more specific and take the rule enunciated by most speakers and savants that "the speaker should never stoop to off-color stories, lewdness or pornographic materials" in addressing an audience and especially never to a

mixed audience. Suppose that you were addressing an audience of school teachers (men and women, young and old). Would you tell lewd off-color stories and use pornographic materials as visual aids? Good sense forbids it! Yet under certain circumstances, it would be absolutely essential for you to do so. How could this be?

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Suppose that your message, the one thing of which you wanted to convince your audience, was that "X magazine is corrupting the morals of our students." To prove your point you would not only have to show that the students were avid readers of X magazine, you would have to prove that its salacious pictures and stories had incited moral lapses — and to do that you would need to show the pictures and to quote from the particular passages which blueprinted the particular lapses. The rule which holds true for the great majority of speaking situations would not hold true for this one.

Another of the more rigid rules of public speaking pertains to the length of the speech. The textbook writers and general practioners of the art of public speaking concur in recommening that no speech be permitted to exceed the allotted time by more than a very small fraction of the original allocation. There are those who say, for example, "No souls are saved after fifteen minutes."

As a general rule, this may be true — but it is not for specific instances which occur with a fair degree of frequency. Some messages are requested by the audiences and are desperately needed by the audiences making the requests. Many times the message cannot be effectively developed in the amount of time set aside for its presentation. The speaker then has his choice of action. He may refuse to speak. He may refuse to speak on this subject, but suggest an alternative. He may accept and emasculate his message. He may accept, ignore the specified time limit, and give the audience the inspiration (or information) for which

LISTEN PERSUASIVELY

about to crawl into the visitor's lap. Moderation in all things applies to listening, too. One ought to permit a wholesome amount of changing expression

permit a wholesome amount of changing expression on the features. But a judicious balance between too much and too little is highly desirable. The poker face should be reserved for playing poker.

However, if one listens carefully and is careful in listening it is possible to impress even so notable a personage as a professor of Speech!

it asked. If he really gives the audience what it wanted to hear from him, his ignoring of the time limit will be applauded and not censured — in fact, the audience will not even know that it has been exceeded. The message itself will so completely hold the attention and interest that the passage of time will not be noted. If he does not give it what it wanted to hear, he had no business ignoring the time limit.

Yet, lest this be taken as an unbreakable rule (Give your audience what it wants to hear from you!), let us consider exceptions to this maxim. It applies only when what the audience wants to hear and what the speaker wants it to hear are identical. If what the audience wants to hear and what the speaker wants it to hear are in conflict, it is a general rule (and a good one) that the speaker be true to his own convictions, that he not change his point of view (as the chameleon changes his color) to match the attitude of each audience he addresses.

Again, we cannot let this rule, good as it is, stand without qualification. It certainly does not mean that a speaker, in preparing a message for an audience which is opposed to his point of view, should stick to his original point of view when study, reflection, and new circumstances bring him to doubt the completeness of his own view of the truth. Emerson has pointed out that "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." The effective speaker is not afraid to admit that his original point of view has changed and to be true to those new convictions as long as, and only as long as, new truths do not bring about still additional change in those convictions.

Do not be afraid to "go against the rules" when confronted by an unusual speech situation. Remember that there is no rule which holds true one hundred per cent of the time, except the rule that there is no rule which holds true one hundred per cent of the time.

THE EFFECTIVE LISTENER

······

The listener gleans
What the speaker means,
And he knows
How the speaker knows.
He has to listen
For what's missin',

And always, of course, He weighs the source.

- P. D. H.

⁴ Elocution books (circa 1890) contained photographic plates showing the correct facial expressions for such emotions as amusement, disbelief, contempt, wonder, and scorn. But anyone who wishes to listen dramatically is advised to make his own faces.

Why On Earth Do People Go To Conventions?

by J. Calvin Callaghan

Dr. Callaghan (Ph.D., Wisconsin) is Chairman of Rhetoric and Public Address at Syracuse, former president of SAES, a veteran conventioneer, and author of several perceptive articles in TODAY'S SPEECH. The paper was presented at the SAA Convention, Chicago, Dec. 30, 1958.

WHY DO PEOPLE GO TO CONVENTIONS? Or more accurately, why on *earth* do people go to conventions? God only knows: I'm sure I don't.

I look again at the subject assigned me: the real and hidden purposes. The phrasing implies that we pack our bags each year with both overt and covert motivations, with the rhetorical trinity of general, specific, and ulterior purposes. How does one, through search or research, detect such purposes?

Reflection in my quiet study was in vain. I don't even know why I go. One year I left my family on Christmas Day: the only accounting for that must have been some species of compulsion neurosis. And before we laugh that off, perhaps we should at least wonder whether we annually shuffle off to cities north, south, east, and west, merely because we've formed a habit pattern we're too timid to resist. Is there a convention rut? Or would you prefer, are we in the groove? Are social-conformity motives involved?

I thought of asking some friends of mine why they were coming to this convention. I even considered sitting down at this point, after asking each of you to rise in turn and expose why you came. The trouble is, the motivational researchers have hidden-persuaded us that we never really know why we do what we do—and even if we did know, we wouldn't tell, probably would be ashamed to tell. Untutored as I am in depth-probing techniques, I gave up that means of amassing reliable data.

I thought, too, of Matthew Arnold's suggestion, of learning the best that has been known and thought — and published — on this subject of conventions. I recalled two recent, rather inspiring essays: one by our own J.B.H., noter, quoter, and anecdoter in our Autumn '58 Journal of Communication; the other by a fellow who calls himself ST, in the February '57 Quarterly Journal of Speech. I noted the latter's revelation that there exist Gray-indexed articles on this subject.

Nor are we in Speech alone in speculating on why we attend conventions. I climbed into the odoriferous recesses of our chemistry building, and in its branch library discovered that back in 1950 our chemical colleagues conducted an extensive scrutiny of their convening selves, in a questionnaire mailed to a 10% sample of American Chemical Society members, with a "phenomenal" 79% return. In this report in the Chemical and Engineering News for August 6, 1951, Table 17 attracted me: "Chief Reasons for Attendance" at nine different meetings.

Would you pardon a few statistical percentages? Coming to hear papers: varied from 66% to 86% of those attending.

Coming to contact others in attendance: varied from 57% to 67%.

Coming to present papers or to preside: from 9% to 30%.

Coming to seek employment: from 4% to 17%. (But how many didn't want to admit it, even to themselves?)

Coming because of Society organizational work: 4% to 13%.

Coming to seek employees (note that supply exceeded demand): 2% to 7%.

The final category is the usual one: "other" reasons, 2% to 8%.

Two additional data from this report are illuminating: "Without a doubt the most important single variable affecting attendance is distance." And the two major reasons for *non*attendance: distance, correlated with expense; and "conflict with primary activity or personal situation at the time." Like so many scientific studies, I presume, this confirms what we have always surmised.

II

At long last, tardily, a conviction has grown on me – pristinely profound. I suppose we're asking why people go to conventions because, if only we could find out, perhaps we could then more fruitfully design convention programs and activities to fulfill these felt and hidden needs. We

can't. We can't, because the purposes are too variant. They vary with individuals, and with time, and with the maturing of a professional organization. They vary from, in the Ed Murrow phrase, person to person. They vary, in any given person, from time to time. They vary, in any given association or society, over the years. May I violate the law of partition and comment simultaneously on all three of these, dicta-obiter though they may be?

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Many of us, I suspect, undergo a sort of inevitable evolution over the years of our conventiongoing. As bright, eager young men and women, fresh out of school or graduate school, we approach our first convention with the most noble of all goals: the selfish desire to learn, to enhance our knowledge of our discipline, to compensate for our lack of skill in teaching it.

I remember why I went to my first Speech convention. I had begun to teach Speech after having elected only 9 hours of instruction in it. A hobby had suddenly been transformed into a vocation. It wasn't that I didn't know enough about the field of Speech: I knew scarcely anything about it. So I saturated myself in a regimen of most carefully selected sectional meetings, even leaving in the middle of one to trek to another in a different room. The primordial thrill of that first convention somewhat abashes me now. But, I confess, that thrill persisted for a number of years. I still don't know much about the field of Speech: unfortunately, I now think I do. Somewhere through the years I became a sophomore; conventions ceased to be learning modes. Could we find some way to become radiant freshmen again, every year at convention time?

Or to say it in another way, could we somehow graduate more swiftly into upperclass standing? For a convention-attending motive to which we should all aspire has been aptly phrased by a revered member of our profession. In the words of Mr. Brigance, responding to a "Shop Talk" inquiry:

A convention makes me humble again. I meet somebody in the lobby, and ask in greeting, "What are you doing these days?" He tells me he is experimenting with a new method of motivating sophomores; and I wonder why I had not thought of that. I attend half a dozen sectional meetings. I hear perhaps twenty-five papers: On research in how to teach Interpretation effectively. On communication techniques used by the Air Force. On Ramus and sixteenth-century education. . . . On Burke and the Dinner Bell legend. I

feel like a man gazing into the universe through the lens of the Palomar telescope. For three convention days I am in the midst of people who possess infinite knowledge, who constantly are expanding that infinite universe, and who are engaged in defining what it means. I return home no longer complacent, but knowing that I am in the position of that DC-7 pilot who said, "In my business so much is being discovered that you've got to run like hell to stand still."

At my own second convention I added another purpose. Famous names I had read under article titles in the Quarterly. I wanted to view the map for which the name was a sign. Not to hero-worship: but to bask in the reflecting sunlight of a satellite, to revel in a planet's gravitation toward its sun. I sought men, speaking. Some of them spoke well; others did not. And I discovered that learning could occur in the convention equivalent of the Congressional cloakroom — Winans-fashion in the lobby, Byers-fashion in the bar. I learned much that was practical, not to be condemned. Shop-talk with a purpose — and a defensible result, the give-and-take of experience and ideas, some closely reasoned, some brain-stormed. Then would I have argued for fewer meetings, longer gaps between them, for extracurricular pursuits.

Some persons, perhaps all persons from time to time, attend conventions for additional reasons. We go to convert our heathen colleagues, to plug pet prejudices: semantics, linguistics, group dynamics, interpersonal communication — what's the latest fad in our field?

We go just to get away from it all at convention time. "It all" may be our wives, our children—the little ones we have to change, the teen-agers we can't figure out how to change—the old routine, the old office in the most decrepit building on campus, in which the Speech Department is normally housed. We're on vacation and the outlay is tax-deductible. We go to acquire culture, and here I employ the word in Richard Murphy's sense:

I have always tried to include some little bit of culture in a convention stay. If in Chicago, perhaps the Stockyards, or if in New York, a ferry ride to Hoboken. It may have been overdone at bit in Los Angeles, with a tour through the movie studios, and a view of the Tournament of Roses and the Rose Bowl.

We go because in the splendid isolation of our ivory-tower life we just want a trip, and the college will pay part of our expenses. Or if it won't pay unless we read a paper, we read a paper. And if we can subsequently get the paper published,

our dean is pleased. This is known as professional advancement.

Some somehow get sucked or suckered into the vortex of the vast administrative machinery of operating a large association: offices, committee chairmanships and memberships, interest groups, legislative assemblies, administrative councils. The siren call of such duties can become a subtly satisfying rationalization for going, we know not why.

We go because we'd like to get a different job, and we know that conventions are slave marts, for which no emancipating Lincoln is ever likely to appear.


Some of us generate a very human reason: over the years we make a few friends, at first professional, then personal, and the only time we can see them, chat with them, is convention time. Maybe we're just gregarious, and conventions offer a convenient outlet — and maybe this is reason enough.

III

As an association ages, becomes more serviceable to an ever-widening circle of members, uncritically succumbing to the American dream that bigger equates better, the convening purposes of it and its members mutate. I recall a bleak Saturday morning in April, 1946, in the first convention of a regional association following a War hiatus. A program had been arranged which normally would have attracted at least a hundred. But at this poorly attended meeting there were 17. So in a medium-sized ballroom we dispensed with the platform, the lectern, the microphone. We dispensed with the papers which had been written. We just sat around in a circle and talked. One of these 17 was one of the founders of that association, and I still recall his comment at the end of that meeting: "This was like the early years: conventions were better then." Could we find some way to lend a hick-town flavor to our metropolitan, Conrad-Hilton-type togetherness?

A philosophy professor of mine, many years ago, said something I've never forgotten. He said the only thing he was absolutely sure of, in this our world, is the fact of individual differences. We get back to people. No two of us go to conventions for the same reasons, or combination and permutation of reasons. No two, no *one*, for the same reasons at all times. *Perhaps* we may generalize: in our early years we go for *real* reasons, of which we're proud. As we get older, wiser, less mature, our hidden motivations take over—and

(Continued on page 22)



THE MALIGNANT HEAREOTYPE

by Barbara Lieb

A native New Yorker and graduate of Queens, Miss Lieb is an M.A. candidate at Penn State.

A FEW YEARS AGO, WHILE ATTENDING one of the New York City colleges as an undergraduate in speech, I encountered a situation that was very disturbing. Many students who were interested in teaching in the New York City school system were put into remedial Speech classes, where they discovered for the first time in their lives that their speech was "sub-standard." Although the motives of the Speech instructors were good, their primary aim being to free these teachers from sloppy voice and articulation errors, the actual results are more complex.

The students themselves too often got only the idea that they were being made to speak like "educated New Yorkers." At first they were dismayed at being put into remedial speech classes. "After all," they said, "aren't we educated New Yorkers?" Later, their dismay deepened as they learned to distinguish between their speech, and desirable" or "standard" speech. In the middle of the course many of them panicked. How could they ever change their speech into the desired pattern in time to pass the New York City teachers' examination?

But the most important part of this story is that these otherwise confident students began to dislike their own speech. The good intentions of the teachers in the remedial program had somehow taken the form of a value judgment in the minds of the students.

The new pattern was standard, desirable—therefore good; their patterns were sub-standard, undesirable, therefore bad. They now wrinkled their noses at classmates who said reound for round, toim for time or at those who dentalized their t's, d's, n's and l's. Needless to say, they also disliked themselves when they slipped back into the "old" pattern. They now considered themselves to be "educated" speakers—the dentalizers were "sub-standard."

The students' criterion for what was standard was now the *heareotype* that had unwittingly been built into them. They were now experts! They now considered it to be their duty to show other New Yorkers how awful their substandardisms were. Their aim while listening to the speech of

others was to detect as many of these errors as they possibly could. It was time now to *malign*, and then listen! As a result of their new campaign, the veteran of the remedial speech class formed some mighty peculiar speech attitudes: Boston speech is "cultured," Southern speech is "charming," mid-western speech is "typically American." But New York speech — well, who wants to sound like Arnold Stang?

We have Lippmann-ized many of our visual expectancies in the form of the stereotype. But it seems to me to be high time that we started becoming aware of some of our auditory expectancies which appear in the form of our heareotypes. We hear sound patterns, and we believe that we know the whole nature of the person. We expect certain sounds to go with certain people. The low-voiced woman is expected to be seductive, the New Yorker is expected to be loud, the foreigner is expected to have an accent, etc. We have heareotypes for sex, age, region, level of education, social status, and for all of the various personality types. We even have built-in heareotypes for many professions and occupations.

I am reminded, for example, of an experience of one of my professors who was teaching the basic college Speech course. It seems that the speech of this professor was liberally sprinkled with a variety of slang. Each time one of these words was uttered, one of his freshman girls squirmed uneasily. Finally, when she reached the point in the semester where she could stand it no longer, she approached the teacher, and said, "Dr. ——, you've got to stop using slang immediately." "Why?" said Dr. ——. "Because," said she, "You are a professor!"

Our heareotypes are so firmly entrenched in us that they even appear in our language. The good child is one who is "seen, but not heard." The mother warns her teen-aged daughter to beware of quiet men because "still water runs deep." The small child is told to "stop whining" because she sounds like an "old woman." The small boy is told to "stop crying" because it is "unmanly."

, 1960

 $^{^{\}rm t}$ cf. Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York, 1956), p. 81: "we define first, and then see."

Our heareotypes even appear in reference to what one likes to listen to. Those who like to listen to classical music are "highbrow," whereas those who like "rock 'n roll" are crude or "low-brow."

Like the stereotype, the heareotype is a handy way of classifying. To a great extent, many successful theater performances depend upon our heareotypes. Music must be used to stir up moods of repose or of tension. Actors must use various dialects to suggest the flavor of the regional or cultural "classes" they portray.

The danger of the hereotype, however, occurs when we "malign first and then listen." Our maligning is so potent that it very often blocks our communicative listening. Consider, for example, how many people still think of the stutterer, the foreigner, or anyone else who "cannot express himself easily," as being stupid. Such a person becomes so impatient with the sounds the stutterer is making (how he is talking), that he seldom listens for what the stutterer means. The judge on the New York Board of Examiners is so upset by the potential teacher's "sub-standard articulation" that he fails to listen for his other qualifications as teacher. The pseudo-intellectual, satisfied that he is seen at a concert and that he can show the world his "intelligence," never bothers to listen for the deeper meanings and implications of the music that he hears.

However, the core of the malignancy lies in the danger that our heareotypes are filters through which we listen to the world. Just as with the stereotype, where our eye selects and sees only what the seer wants or *expects* it to see, so with the heareotype — where the ear selects for its response only those sound patterns making up content which will fit the listener's built-in expectancies.

If we expect our students' first speeches to sound unintelligent, we are apt to select for listening and responding only those aspects of their speeches which fit this expectancy. If we know we are speaking with a person of an opposing political, religious, educational or other philosophy, we will listen to only those aspects of what he is saying that represent the oppositional viewpoint; we will argue hotly against this "jackass," blithely ignoring, as though he had never mentioned it, any parts of his viewpoint that happen to coincide with ours. Or, turn the coin over — if we have always loyally supported one political party, we will hear from its current candidate only those aspects of his speech with which we already agree, ignoring any fallacies in reasoning, blunders, mistakes, etc.

We are loathe to part with our heareotypes because they are our expectancies, and our expectancies are part of us. They are built into us often by that mysterious process of introjection or of "swallowing whole" the tid-bits of "wisdom" thrown to us by our forefathers. Few people enjoy parting with, or in essence changing, parts of themselves. Shocks to our expectancies are disturbing. For example, have you ever met a man who was extremely large in size and who suddenly spoke in a voice that was thin and high-pitched? You were disturbed when he first spoke because your expectancy or heareotype for a large-sized man was a deep voice. However, after hearing this man speak many times, perhaps you got used to the high-pitched voice. You had built in a new expectancy for this man's speech pattern, and were no longer disturbed by his voice.

If events which are contrary to our present expectancies are so disturbing, how can we get rid of our heareotypes? The answer probably lies in punching and enlarging more holes in our filter systems. That is, we must listen communicatively to more sounds from our external world. The malignant heareotype may be torn out by its roots if we try listening for the meanings and implications behind the sound patterns rather than for the structures of the sound patterns themselves.

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Do They Really Listen To Radio?

by William D. Sample

Head of the Radio-TV Department at St. Lawrence University, Mr. Sample (M.A., Penn State) has before this come up with several provocative and stimulating ideas on how to improve radio-tv shows.

EEECH," SCREAMED THE TORTURED tires as they skidded around the corner across the wet pavement. "BRAT Tat Rat Tat," barked the machine gun from the speeding car. A passing lady shopper screams, "Help police – that man's been shot." The dull hollow sound of a man hitting the sidewalk, "flop ker plop" – and another radio program is on the air.

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In the decade before television became an American reality, radio provided the most exciting and creative program entertainment in its history. In less time than it takes to read the first paragraph on this page an adroit sound effects man and one actress would convey the story of a gangster murder just as vividly as any writer could hope to achieve with words alone, and probably with more excitement than television can show it today.

For in the days when radio occupied the top priority spot in American homes its programs were designed, written, directed and performed in most cases to make the listener not a witness to the proceedings but a participant. The listener was required to provide those elements which sightless radio could not. He had to utilize his own imagination to create all visual elements of a story, event, or performance.

Television today can and does tell effective dramatic stories, such as the gangster murder; however, it does so at a fantastically higher cost. Three people were all that were necessary in

Three people were all that were necessary in radio to "rub out" a hood. A sound effects man, an actress and a listener. TV would require cameramen, scores of actors, scenery, lighting, huge studios, dozens of engineers, etc., to capture visually and aurally the same brief simple story. TV has, in short, eliminated the need for the listener to participate by providing his own imagination and that is one reason why the old radio listener has become the TV viewer. He is now a spectator. Essentially there is nothing wrong in this. Cer-

Essentially there is nothing wrong in this. Certainly it is better to be able actually to see as well as hear a Congressional investigation, a national political party convention, a quality performance of an excellent play, than to just hear it. Obviously TV can provide us with much better programs

than radio ever could whenever visualization is vital to understanding or in gaining greater appreciation.

Unfortunately, though, radio has somehow forgotten its magic ingredient during the transitional years since TV emerged. Radio no longer, to any real extent, asks or requires the listener to be a participant in a program by using his own imagination.

This, more than anything else, is the fundamental reason why network radio is in a continuing state of decline. Networks gradually abandoned the radio programs they had spent twenty years developing, when television could present the same thing visually. In replacing the shows which asked listeners to be participants, they offered programs which required little or no imaginative efforts on the part of the listener; hence the listener did not have to make an effort or concentrate on hearing — he was freed to run about his home, wash dishes, fix his hi-fi set, take a bath, or play cards. Radio programs became mere background noise for other activities.

And in broadcasting simple background noise, radio stations began to discover they could do the job as effectively and at less cost than networks. Advertisers also discovered they could purchase time at many local stations cheaper than buying time on a network for the same kind of programming.

Now in the broadcasting industry it is wise to remember that though broadcasters sell time, a sponsor buys an audience — and programs create their own audience.

As a result sponsors now find that local independent radio stations offer a great variety of basically different types of background noise for active Americans. Consequently they purchase time on stations whose noise appeals to the segment of the public which is most likely to purchase their products. For example, a station which plays only a series of rock and roll records daily might be an excellent place for a sponsor to advertise a soft drink—since that station's audience will be predominantly teenagers. On the other hand a classi-

cal music station might not help a sponsor sell pop, but it could sell Pop on buying a Cadillac.

However, background noise does not require any imaginative listening, and there are some serious reservations in many of the national advertisers' minds as to whether an inattentive and active listener will actually hear and respond to a commercial

This perhaps explains one of the reasons why most radio stations today depend upon local advertisers for the bulk of their billings. For example, in 1958 advertisers spent \$519 million on radio time, but only \$46 million of this went to the networks.

Of course, most national advertisers once heard on network radio have shifted over to network television, though some still are utilizing both.

At the local station and at the network, the basic problem in radio programming still remains largely unsolved. If programs are to consist mostly of either background noise or background quality music, will they create an audience which a sponsor will buy? Perhaps they will create an audience — so far everything indicates they will — but is it an audience which really is listening? Does it hear and respond to the commercial? For in the last analysis that is what the sponsor requires.

The way out of the dilemma which networks face is quite obvious. Finding program forms which for short durations require the listener to participate by invoking his own imagination will create attentive audiences which hear and respond to radio commercials.

Local stations with fewer resources to call upon may find this task too difficult and, perhaps, unnecessary, or seemingly unnecessary, at present; but the solution remains nevertheless as valid at local level as at network.

How does one find and develop programs of three, five, eight, or ten minutes duration which require the invocation of listener imagination?

Creative experimentation.

There are a couple of guide lines which may be helpful in starting. First, story-telling down through the ages has consistently been attention-getting and attention-holding when properly done. Second, the experience of radio indicates that sounds alone can tell stories and simultaneously invoke listener imagination. Third, the relationship between the listener-audience and radio, being intimate, is personal and, therefore, to be successful a program's content must have a common ground upon which immediate understanding between listener and content can be established. The pro-

gram, in other words, must relate to the lives — the actual experiences of the listener.

This is not to say that rules, or guide lines, or whatever you choose to call them, cannot be broken — and still be successful.

Creative experimentation to develop programs of short duration which require the listener to use his imagination can be developed. Once in use they offer the best possible variation in programming for networks as well as independent stations to guarantee a sponsor an attentive listening audience.

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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York 3, N. Y.

SPEECH in GERMAN Universities

by Fred L. Casmir

Professor of Speech at George Pepperdine College, Los Angeles, Mr. Casmir has his M.A. from Ohio State; readers will recall his "Importance of Speech" in our November, 1959, issue.

In the fall of 1957 the writer, who is himself German by birth and spent most of his life in Germany, became concerned with the question of how much emphasis is placed on studies in Germany which generally speaking are included under the term "Speech" in the United States.

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Important and far-reaching changes have taken place in Germany since the end of World War II. To an educator it is of some importance to find out if these developments have brought about any changes in direction, as far as the curriculum of the leading academic institutions is concerned. To us the terms "democracy" and "Speech" are very closely related, or perhaps it would be even better to say "interwoven." Germany has gone through a period of readjustment and re-education, most of which was forced upon it by the outside world.

To further develop democratic ideals, and to contribute to the ability to think along lines different from the ones impressed upon Germany's youth by Hitler's dictatorship, should, in our opinion, be at least part of the work of Germany's colleges and universities. We do not mean to imply that "Speech" presents the only possibility of academic training in this regard; but it is felt that greater familiarity with the principles of oral communication will provide German academicians with a much sounder basis for the evaluation of group processes and individual actions.

We realize that it would be impossible to evaluate the existing problem realistically if one were to forget the traditional aims and goals of German higher education. From our experiences, and from our contacts with German academicians, we have drawn the conclusion that there still can be found a kind of "holy horror" when it comes to the consideration of "practical" matters as part of the academic curriculum. Centuries of thought in Germany have stressed the abstract and the ability to think, over the ability to apply what one has learned. The reactions in some of the replies which we received made clear that "Speech" was unacceptable to many colleges and universities in Germany because of its concrete foundation in the practical applications of the principles learned.

To the German academician it seems difficult, to say the least, to see "dramatics" as part of a university curriculum. "It's simply not academic enough." Perhaps we tend to oversimplify the problem, yet we cannot forget the story of a rather famous psychologist, European by birth, who taught in an American university, and who promptly exploded when one of his students making an oral report dared to state that "... the practical application of the foregoing material is ..." by calling out: "Verboten, verboten!" Or one might recall the group of European "scientists" during the middle-ages who had a lengthy debate on the possible number of teeth a donkey might have, until the problem was solved by a stable boy who simply opened the mouth of the beast and looked.

A questionnaire was developed, in German, which was intended to secure as much varied information as possible concerning "Speech" in German, universities. Sixteen universities and colleges were contacted, and although only six answered, their replies can probably be considered as being representative of the general picture in Germany, as far as academic work in the field of Speech is concerned. One problem the writer encountered was in the translation of terms which are widely used in the United States by all of us in Speech, yet which do not seem to have counterparts with exactly the same meaning in German. The term "Speech" in itself presented a problem. In the questionnaire it was explained that the English term "Speech" would be translated "Kommunikationswissenschaft" (communications science) and the term "Speech subjects" would be translated as "kommunikationswissenschaftliche Faecher." A ra-ther frightening word was thus "created," but the reaction to it seemed to indicate that it served its purpose for this particular study.

The University of Freiburg in Breisgau sent an answer through its Department of Philosophy, stating that one man, Dr. Walter Kuhlman, was working in the field described as "Sprechkunde," which, in a later question, was indicated as including public address, speech correction, and discussion. No answers were received to questions on studies, pub-

lications, or dissertations by students and faculty members. It was also indicated that Dr. Kuhlmann was interested in phonetics, referred to as "Lautlehre." No answer was received on the number of students enrolled in Speech courses.

Answers from the Universities of Heidelberg and of Erlangen indicated that there was no work in Speech in these two schools. The University of Wuerzburg indicated that Speech was not being taught, at least not as a science. There was, however, practical instructions in the art of speaking and voice development. In addition, training was provided for people with laryngeal difficulties in

a laryngological clinic.

Three other universities had somewhat more encouraging reports to make. At the University at Bonn, the Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universitaet, the questionnaire had been filled out in the Institute for Phonetics and Communications Research. It was indicated that Dr. Werner Meyer-Eppler was interested in different Speech fields, including information theory ("Informationstheorie"), phonetics ("Phonetik"), and acoustics ("Akustic"). The following subjects are being taught: phonetics, oral interpretation ("Interpretation"), radio and television ("Rundfunk und Fernsehen"), acoustics, linguistics ("Linguistik"), and information theory, with approximately 40 students working in these different fields. Publications on the following subjects were mentioned as Meyer-Eppler's contributions: application of communications research; Lee-effect; and experimental work on voice and listening, as well as journals on information theory. In addition, Meyer-Eppler mentioned that several doctor's dissertations concerned with "Sprachtypologie" (Language typology) were written at Bonn. These studies and dissertations had to do with "the phonemic and supra-phomenic structure of languages."

An answer was received from Prof. Dr. O. von Essen of the Phonetic Laboratory of the University of Hamburg. Besides von Essen, Dr. Hans-Heinrich Waengler and Prof. Dr. Giulio Panconcelli-Calzia (emeritus), are named as being interested in the major fields of phonetics, including voice and speech disorders ("timm-und Sprechstoerungen"), and phonology ("Phonologie"). Phonetics is being taught as well as voice ("Stimme"), oral interpretation ("Sprechen," "sprecherische Ausdruck"), and dramatics (actually theater-science, "Theaterwissenschaft"). Speech correction, within the curriculum of the Pedagogic Institute connected with the university, is of interest to some professors. Approximately 70 students are enrolled in the courses. A number of articles in the areas of phonetics, voice, expression, and speech correction have been published by the staff. The two following titles are representative of dissertations completed at Hamburg:

Martens, Peter: "Vergleichende Untersuchung der Sprechmelodie in der Hamburger und Muenchner Umgangssprache," Dissertation,

Hamburg, 1953.

Heidt, Karl: "Laut u. Ton in Foruba," Dissertation, Hamburg, 1954.

From the University of Goettingen we received not only a completed questionnaire but a rather detailed letter from Dr. Phil. M. H. Kaulhausen. Her letter contains several interesting comments on Speech.

In West Germany "Sprechkunde" (Speech) is not an independent course of study at any university as it is in yours. There are only "lektorate mit selbstaendigem Lehrauftrag" (lecturers classified as independent, or non-affiliated with any department.) However, doctor's dissertations cannot be handled by us.

In addition to teaching such, we also have here at the throat-nose, and ear clinic (under the direction of Prof. Frenzel) a former student of mine, Mrs. Joede. She has passed the Speech examination and was examined in speech correction ("Sprachheilkunde") by Prof. Loebell. She is treating organic and functional

voice and speech disorders.

Dramatics is generally speaking not a branch of Speech. It is, where it does exist, a part of the Germanic Institute. The "Laienspiel" (literally: lay-man's play, a special kind of dramatic performance in which those are trained who are not foremost interested in professsional acting — Ed.) which we practice for the benefit of future teachers, is part of Speech. Also phonetics is generally speaking a subject which is independent of Speech, and is not, as with you, a part of "Speech." But, nevertheless, phonetics is taught students in Speech also, and is expected of them.

Later, Dr. Kaulhausen indicates that she has been in this country to read German poetry at the Universities of Madison and Detroit. She visited several Departments of Speech, and was deeply impressed with the place Speech has in the curriculum of many of these schools. She gave a report to an organization of "Sprechkundler" (Speech people) in Essen, concerning her contacts with Speech Departments in America.

Two instructors work in the field of Speech at the University of Goettingen, Dr. Kaulhausen, who is a lecturer for "Sprechkunde" and "Sprecherziehung" (Speech, and, what could probably be best translated as, Speech training), while another, Dr. Magda Ferenbach, is working as a "Lehrbeauftragte" (an instructor who seemingly has no specific academic position) in the same field, but mainly with foreign students. Dr. Kaulhausen mentioned her major interests as lying in Metrics ("Metrik"), the art of speaking, or Speech ("Sprechkunst"), "Laienspiel," radio speech ("Rundfunksprechen"). Dr. Ferenbach's major interests are speech correction, phonetics, and public speaking ("Redekunst"). Between 150-200 students are enrolled in courses in public address ("Aussprache oder Vortrag"), discussion ("Diskussion"), oral interpretation ("Sprechkunst"), "Laienspiel," radio and television ("Rundfund und Fernsehen"), debate ("Streitgespreache"), voice ("Strimmbildung"), and metrics ("Metrik oder Verslehre"). The two professors have published articles on Speech education, poetry and its interpretation, Speech problems, Speech education for children, and analysis of Speech difficulties.

The only possibility, as we see it, that greater stress will be put on teaching Speech in German

universities lies in the fact that a democratic nation, and Germany is fast becoming that, must have people who are interested in the study of human communications. Our survey does not seem to indicate that such an interest is now widespread or even growing. It is still a very limited field and is not assigned an important part in the university curriculum. Furthermore, the more "scientific" areas of Speech, such as phonetics and speech-correction, have a much stronger representation in the curricula than our more "practical" areas, such as discussion and public address.

The strongest influence, as far as new directions for the study and teaching of Speech in German universities is concerned, seems to be exerted by those individuals who have had contact or maintain contact with American academicians who are concerned with the teaching of Speech in this country. If these findings are not conclusive, they are at least interesting, and they are presented in the hope that, in the future, better understanding of each other's work will further the cause of Speech both in America and Germany.

CREATIVE DISCUSSION

by RUPERT L. CORTRIGHT and GEORGE L. HINDS, both, Wayne State University

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- helps give an understanding of discussion in relation to all other approaches to group method
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CREATIVE DISCUSSION consists of three main sections: The Nature of Discussion presents the underlying philosophy, contemporary usages and common procedures of discussion; Techniques for Creative Discussion considers the processes and techniques of effective discussion practice, including skills of speaking and listening and semantics; Applications of Discussion offers variations in practice as related to form, manpower utilization and personal involvements.

1959, 303 pages, \$4.50 (text edition)

The Macmillan Company 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y.

Personality of the Successful Speech Therapist

by Conrad F. Wedberg

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A Consultant in Speech Therapy for the California State Department of Public Instruction, Mr. Wedberg has his M.A. from Redlands and additional graduate study at the U. of California.

In our public school program for the education of exceptional children we have observed that what a speech therapist means to a child, as a person, is as important as what he does as a speech therapist. Speech drills, exercises, gadgets and devices, all the accessories one might accumulate and apply in a public school speech therapy program, though they can be very beneficial as a means towards an end, may be simply time-wasting and meaningless unless there is basically a free and easy therapist-child relationship.

What identifiable personality characteristics in the therapist lead to such wholesome and dynamic

relationships?

In a rather large town in California there are twenty elementary schools with six speech and hearing therapists. One of these, pseudonymously, is Marge Olsen. Marge is not a beautiful woman, but she is attractive in many ways. She dresses quite plainly and has never been exactly attractive to men, so Marge is unmarried at middle age. She was not too popular in college, has never been called superior or brilliant, and has probably never been president or chairman, not even sergeant-atarms, of any group. But Marge is known by her colleagues as sincere, dependable, a person they can trust; and the children in her speech classes love her. I have seen her combing out kinks in a little girl's hair while they worked together in a large mirror on the "l" sound in the story of Goldilocks. Children know her and call her "Marge" on the playground. They feel safe and sure of themselves around her, for there is something about Marge Olsen that is good for children in the booming, nervous town of Ulcer, California.

One of Marge Olsen's colleagues, Vina Amber, is an exciting, impetuous, red-haired-upon-occasion, neuro-galvanic extrovert. Around Vina one is likely to hear or to make such comments as "preens like a peacock," or "sedate as a hydrogen bomb." Vina seems to have boundless energy, is usually president or chairman of something, under casual scrutiny is a beautiful woman in her late thirties who

loves her husband and two children. She loves hats, and she wears them well. Vina's colleagues know her as a sincere person they can trust, and the children in her speech classes love her. There is a warmth about Vina that is contagious, children feel safe and sure of themselves around her, no matter how severely speech handicapped they may be, and there is something sparkling about Vina that is good for the less exotic in her profession. A recent rating classification placed both Marge and Vina high on the list of successful teachers in the schools of Ulcer, California.

In Marge Olsen and Vina Amber we have, obviously, two extremes of a common personality classification, the introvert and the extravert. Does this make a difference that really matters, if both are successful speech therapists? What is it that really makes a measurable difference, an identifiable characteristic that spells out *success* in the

public school speech therapist?

II

Here we need to pause for a moment and define some terms. What do the words "personality" and "success" represent in this frame of reference?

Personality is a process, an ever-changing process, not a static, circumscribed organism with which each of us was originally endowed. Personality cannot be limited to physical or mental, biological or social, neurological or endocrinological, but in this discussion will be thought of as all of these things synchronized into a basic psychophysical makeup which is played upon by environment as long as we live.

Success is a relative thing, depending upon who is doing the measuring. Let us assume that success in public school speech therapy is not an ability to please school administrators, to handle heavy caseloads, or to accumulate exorbitant reimbursement funds, but that success implies the favorable modification of defective speech in school children, within reasonable prognoses.

Now back to Marge and Vina and our topic we are looking for identifiable characteristics of the ist

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successful speech therapist. It would be easy to close this discussion right here with a descriptive list such as we have read so often: intelligent, resourceful, creative, research-minded, artistic, imaginative, loyal, friendly, alive. Granted, these factors contribute to a well-adjusted personality. But I have in mind only three: humility, patience, and sincerity. I have found these characteristics in Marge Olsen and Vina Amber, and I believe they are vitally important to children with speech handicaps when they approach the therapist-child relationship.

In order fully to comprehend the meaning of humility, patience and sincerity, we need to recognize how these personality characteristics become a part of us. Certain *dynamisms*, frequently known as mechanisms of behavior, such as projection, introjection, identification, sublimation, conversion, substitution — and there are many others — join forces with each other within the individual as he develops his own unique personality. They operate in reaction to a social culture, specifically people. In early life it is people, other persons, that make the differences which matter in each one of us. From the very beginning of conscious awareness of ourselves as human beings, as persons, these dynamisms serve to protect us from outside hurts and pains and to keep inside of us the thoughts and feelings which would hurt others and embarrass us or make us ashamed. It is this conscious awareness of ourselves that separates us mostly, one from another, that makes us different in thinking, feeling, speaking, being listened to, or obtaining recognition from others.

We build walls around feelings and emotions, some to keep out, some to keep in. How thick are these walls? How high do we build our fences of separatedness? The psychiatrist reminds us that we need first to explore within, understand and accept what we find there, then chip away at these walls of separatedness from the inside until it is easy for others, particularly children in our classes, to feel a sense of belongingness and acceptance as they approach our personalities from the outside. It was Dr. Winifred Richmond, then Examining Psychiatrist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C., who many years ago gave us this definition: "The well-adjusted personality implies the smooth, harmonious working together of mind and body in such a way that the individual feels a sense of power and adequacy in dealing with life." Only as we have these feelings, in humility, patience, and sincerity, can we hope that others will find them in close relationships with us.

Number one, then, is humility. Humility is not

a sign of weakness. To be humble does not mean to be spineless. Humility is an expression of self-realization, a profound belief in one's self. Humility comes with insight and understanding, with the conscious awareness of adulthood, with the emotional maturity of acceptance of one's self not as perfection, but rather with tolerance of imperfections without apology. It is this humility that crumbles the walls between us, that lets frustrated children who are hampered in speech dare to be friendly, to trust us and in turn to trust themselves, to feel a sense of belongingness with us and around us, to love and be loved because we feel their needs as we understand our own. This in a successful speech therapist is a dynamic quality, humility.

Number two is *Patience*. The restless, impatient person projects a feeling of discouragement upon those about him. Patience enables a therapist to wait, and this can be of extreme importance to the child. Waiting may mean to be silent, and in silence to listen. Listening is something some people have not done for so many children with speech defects. Some of our most severe speech handicaps such as stuttering or delayed speech in some cases, can be traced to a feeling of *separation* almost as terrifying as the sense of *desertion*, all because talking and listening, both ways, was not satisfactorily developed between the child and human adults.

Speech would never develop if children could not listen and be listened to. Patience dispels anxiety and tension, displaces fear and doubt with trust and faith. The therapist who has learned patience detects the slightest sign of progress and is sensitive to the inner need a child may have at any given moment for encouragement. The speech therapist who has learned to be patient with his own imperfections is well fitted to be a truly successful teacher, in terms of this characteristic of patience.

Humility, patience, and sincerity. Sincerity makes no room for pretense, deception, or half-truths. The child and the parent and the teacher who feel that the speech therapist is honest and realistic in diagnoses and prognoses can accept the problem much more objectively than if, for any reason, it is misrepresented. I have never found any virtue in postponing the realistic aspects of a speech problem, whatever it may be.

One question that is all too frequently asked of the speech therapist by over-anxious parents of a child with cerebral palsy or a cleft palate is: "Will this child ever talk normally?" The answer,

to be sincere, cannot be "Oh yes, of course," or "No, never." The reply of sincerity could well be, "We do not know; but we shall work toward the best results possible."

The lesson of integrity, honesty with ourselves can be a very difficult one to learn, but without it we cannot hope to be sincere with others. Children somehow have a way of detecting the slightest indication that sincerity has not been resolved within us. The child with a speech defect, whose life for that reason or any other has been one of loneliness, finds the warmth of security in this characteristic which may be the most dynamic of all in a successful speech therapist, sincerity.

Humility, Patience, Sincerity – these three. If we have dealt successfully with these personality characteristics and their antagonists in our own lives, and for that reason know them well, what we mean to the child as a person in a free and therapist-child relationship may lead to the success which through us he is hoping to attain.

WHY GO TO CONVENTIONS?

(Continued from page 12)

only three Martinis, mixed 7 to 1, would unveil them.

The vice-president in charge of program will get no directive from me if he seeks to mold his program in the matrix of the purposes, real or hidden, of the convention-goer. The soundest advice I can tender him I steal from a friend of mine, from the conclusion of a sectional meeting at a regional convention a few years ago, one of the most rewarding meetings I've ever sat through. He said at the end: "I've been coming to conventions for years. This year I was asked to sponsor a program. So I arranged one. Whether you would like it or not I didn't know, and I didn't care. This was my chance to create a program that I would enjoy."

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The Institutionalized Personality

by George Gurganus

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JUST HOW MUCH IS A PERSON INFLUENCED by his society? This is a question that has not been answered with finality; however, it does concern many scholars. Floyd Allport, as a social psychologist, would naturally be concerned with this question. In *Institutional Behavior* Allport approaches the problem of the relationship of the individual and the institution and of how one affects the other.

I

In his attempt to define institutions, Allport stated that they are not collections of individuals but are only a portion of the activities of individuals. He said that an institution "is not a tangible thing, but a conceptual relationship of things." There are two kinds of institutions: the large impersonal ones represented by big business, organized religion, and government; and the small personal ones, such as the family and the one-man proprietorship in business. Allport feared the consequences of the first and advocated the second, as is evident from the following statement:

The evil inherent in our social organizations lies in the fact of the social organization itself. Hence the only solution, as I see it, is frankly to give up the ideal of the Great Community and the integrated public and to return, so far as possible, to the face to face relationships of the smaller group and to the total

inclusion of local community living.

The fact that institutions are powerful influences in shaping the lives of individuals is admitted by Allport, but he does not believe that the individual is helpless in resisting this influence. To him, cultural and economic determinism are a "myth." "Instead of accepting society fatalistically," he states, "and trying to adjust ourselves to it, it lies within our powers to keep our own values as individuals and adjust society to ourselves." The final sentence in *Institutional Behavior* seems to include the essence of the message of the whole book: "A better world can only be a world of better and freeer individuals."

Social psychology is an outgrowth or perhaps a reuniting of the fields of Socioloy and Psychology.

This school of thought is of comparatively recent origin. Floyd Allport falls in the stream of Sociological development, which includes the Frenchman Comte, who named the movement; Herbert Spencer, who interpreted it in the light of evolutionary theory; William James, who codified it; and Dewey, Cooley, Mead, and Lippmann, his later contemporaries.

H

Allport draws a word picture of the stream of life being funneled through institutions, with individuals emerging from the funnel with standardized habits and uniform ways of thinking and doing. He sees the following evil consequences in such a situation:

1. The loss of individual initiative and freedom. To Allport, the stifling of individual self-expression and the undermining of the individual's security and independence is an extreme tragedy. Riesman's ideal personality, the autonomous individual, as depicted in *The Lonely Crowd*, seems to fit Allport's view as well. The individual should and can be free to develop naturally, without being forced into an institutional mold.

2. A breakdown in the morals of individuals. Institutional behavior blinds the individual to the

responsibility of his own acts:

The corporate process, both within and outside the organization, thus prevents the formation of consistently honest characters in men and women. Individuals who profit by exploiting the corporate fiction lose insight into their own acts. Failing to recognize their own motives, they practice deception not only on others but also on themselves. Already lacking in social responsibility, they become intellectually dishonest as well.

- 3. The frustration of the individual's appreciation of art. Individuals are unable to appreciate pure art because of their continued "association of the [artistic] impulse with commercial objects and with the prestige which comes from possession and display."
- 4. The prostitution of the scientist. Pure research is not the goal in the scientific field of the

¹ Floyd Henry Allport Institutional Behavior (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 100.
² Ibid., 33.
³ Ibid., 520.

institutional scientist. He seeks simply to serve the interests of his institution. In this connection Allport states:

When we become more interested in electromagnetism than in turning radio knobs, when exploration of the elements is more engrossing to us than patent building blocks and synthetic perfumes, we shall be upon the road to an age of science.

5. The perversion of the social life of the individual. To be successful in an institution one must sometimes subordinate his social life to the interest of the institution. As Allport says, "When we pour our lives through the channel of an institution, we can never know one another as men and women.' In contrast to the institutionalized individual, Allport cites the case of a certain humble merchant in his town who owned and operated his own hardware store. In a "face to face" business relationship, this merchant could have the same personality at work as at play because "in everything he does he can reveal his true nature.

6. The distortion of the true religious impulse of an individual. Organized religion can be and often is the agent that thwarts the natural expression and growth of an individual, according to Allport. He believes that an indiviudal's "adaptation to his universe . . . cannot be made for him through a creed formulated from on high." Business, too, can obscure true religion by becoming a sort of religion itself. Allport's credo:6

The only religion which is constant and dependable, the only character which may claim service for its consistent guiding motive, is to be found in men and women who are superior not only to their business habits, but to their other institutions as well.

7. The sacrifice of the interest and welfare of the individual for the good of the institution. Allport contends that institutions are made for men and not men for institutions. He even goes so far as to advocate a new patriotism, which he describes in the following words:7

His love for his country will be purely personal and within himself. It will never lead him to fight for his country as an entity greater than the particular individuals concerned. . . . Since he has given up the support of a Nation as something outside himself and his fellows, military parades and demonstrations will leave him cold.

Allport affirms that such "a liberation will mean a passage from obscurity to insight, from tribal jealousy to brotherhood, from idolatry to essential

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Walter Lippmann, whose philosophy is nearly like that of Allport, is also a product of Harvard University. He attended there within a few years of the time that Allport was enrolled. Lippmann became a journalist and wrote a number of books. two of which will be examined: Public Opinion (1930) and its sequel The Phantom Public (1930).

The epitome of *Public Opinion* is expressed in the often quoted statement of Lippman's: "For the most part we do not first see and then define, we define first and then see." Allport's view is that institutionalism creates a situation which makes this type of rationalization necessary. He states that communication can only be truly effective in face to face relationships. In the institutional setting "the sign or symbol of communication must become stereotypes, calling forth responses common to all and permitting no individual shades of

At the end of the eighteenth century Gustave Le Bon, in *The Crowd*, set forth a concept of crowd as a thinking, reasoning organism that "forms a single being, and is subject to the law of the mental unity of crowds."10 To Allport, this theory or "law," as it was called, was ridiculous. He could comprehend no collective mind over and above the group. He could see only individuals reacting to one another in group relationships. Lippmann and Allport seemed to agree on this point. Lippmann comments:1

The fundamental contrast is not between public and private enterprises, between "crowd" psychology and individual, but between men doing specific things and men attempt to command general results.

Allport sees the institution as a means of control over its members. By the use of symbols and appeals to institutional lovalty, the leaders can exercise influence over the group. Because their livelihood depends upon the members of the group having such an attitude, "officials tend to foster the belief in the transcendent reality and purpose of their institutions."

The name Phantom Public reveals this same conviction on the part of Lippman. He pictures the public with the power only to substitute ballots for bullets, but they do not and indeed cannot rule themselves. The leaders reign through the appeal to symbols and by molding public opinion.

New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930, p. 81.
 Allport, p. 103.
 London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., first translated 1896, pp. 25-26.
 Op. cit., p. 125.

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"Our public opinions are always and forever, by their very nature, an attempt to control the actions of others from the outside." The ones in power create public opinion and use it as an aid to the accomplishment of their purposes. Lippman's preference was stated at the conclusion of the *Phantom Public*: "It is by the private labor of individuals that life is enhanced. I set no great store on what can be done by public opinion and the action of the masses."11

The roles that an individual plays, according to T. W. Arnold, are little dramas which he has created for himself and in which he is the principal actor. Thus a person's behavior becomes symbolic of the various roles that he plays. Institutions are like people, in that they have similar qualities and personalities and perform some of the same functions as individuals. Difficulty arises with the institutions when the circumstances change but the institutions' symbols remain as they were. Symbols do not change so readily. Advocates arise to arouse support for the old ways and the old symbols. Soon the institution and the symbol have little or no relation in reality, but in the public mind they are still one.

Arnold cites the example of the small businesses operated under the principle of free trade in the early years of our country. Even after the advent of big business, the symbols of the previous era were the generally accepted ones, and men still give lip service to a "rugged individualism" that has ceased to be. Arnold believes in the pragmatic approach and is critical of the idealist who holds on to his principles "so strongly that he cannot fit them into practical needs." Because the symbols and the actual situation in relation to institutions are rarely consistent, Arnold says that the spokesman for institutions should not be expected to be

Allport noted this same inconsistency of symbol and actuality:1

But in any case we shall probably do better if we pay greater heed to the individuality emerging from our children of today than if we attempt to harness these children to the institutional habits of yesterday.

Charles Horton Cooley believed in a "crowd mind," but, unlike Le Bon, who thought that the rule of the people (masses) was a regression to barbarism, he considered the collective mind as a superior force for intelligent progress. Interpreting society in terms of Herbert Spencer's con-

New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930 p. 199.
 Allport, p. 353.

cept of the "survival of the fittest" and of evolutionary progress, Cooley could see only improvement ahead for society. Education, to him, was the principal solution to the problems of society.

Effective communication brought about by wider education would produce a more dynamic and enlightened "public opinion" and "public will." To this "larger will" Cooley ascribed a sort of mystical power. He states that "Public will, like individual will, has the purpose of adaptation to conditions that is rational and economical instead of haphazard and wasteful." Cooley believed that a group makes up its mind just like an individual makes up his mind. In relating these beliefs to democracy, Cooley naturally concluded that a government of the people was the ultimate form. Cooley defined institution as "simply a definite

and established phase of the public mind, not difterent in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have somewhat of a distinct and independent existence."16

Floyd Allport wrote Institutional Behavior for the purpose of opposing practically all of the points mentioned by Cooley as being basic. He took issue with the concept of the "crowd mind," the idea that the masses can rule themselves adequately, and the definition of institution as given by Cooley.

Institutions tend to become the masters of men, but they can become greater servants. This latter possibility is greatly to be desired, in the view of Floyd Allport. His suggestion that society revert back to the face to face relationships in business and in other institutions appears about as practical a piece of advice as Gandhi's proposal to develop ancient home industries in India in the face of the growing industrial development of that country. Perhaps Gandhi's and Allport's motives were similar in their recommendations.

The attachment that Allport expressed for the face to face business dealings of the one-man proprietor reminds one of the local citizen who thought that the development of chain supermarket grocery stores was bad for the community and the country, so he continued to trade in a privately owned store at a sacrifice to himself of money, quality, and efficiency. Meanwhile the crowds were flooding the chain stores in order to take advantage of the savings for themselves, and these stores continued (Continued on page 34)

Social Organization, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913, p. 418.
 Ibid., p. 313.

A CRITIQUE of a TECHNIQUE

by Earl Weber

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Assistant Professor of Industrial Arts in Ohio University, Mr. Weber is completing work for his Ph.D. at Penn State.

B ORIS BOGOSLOVSKY, IN THE PREFACE to *Technique* of *Controversy*, asserts, "The whole book is a continuous effort to work out practical devices for the solution of the concrete problems which confront us in everyday thinking." The very first chapter, "The Puzzle of Modern Reasoning," reveals, however, that this is not just another treatise on "logic as a science or academic subject [which] has the reputation of being something antiquated, scholastic in a bad sense, and utterly divorced from life." Bogoslovsky's approach to the subject, which he calls *Dynamic Logic*, as compared to the traditional classical or Static Logic, reveals a method that he claims may be applied to all intelligent

The plan of this critique will be to provide at least partial answers to these questions: Why has the problem of a new logic arisen? What is the "old logic" that Bogoslovsky refers to? What is meant by Dynamic Logic? How does Dynamic Logic compare with other modern theories of the process of thinking? What conclusions can be made regarding the applicability of Dynamic Logic?

"As the physical world picture grew and technology advanced, those disciplines which rested squarely on 'rational' instead of 'empirical' principles were threatened with complete extinction, and were soon even denied the honorable name of science. Logic and metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics, seemed to have seen their day."2 This is the predicament of the logic with which Bogoslovsky is concerned and which prompts him to say, "Almost everyone who is interested in philosophy, politics, education, or any other so-called inexact science has experienced a feeling of deep disappointment, almost of despair, before the limitations and inefficiency of our reasoning."3

As long as a problem was considered philosophically, and to the extent that it was, the reasoning about the problem was governed by rigid laws. "Aristotle classified the working of reason,

and this founded . . . formal logic." But when a problem was taken over by one of the young sciences, a different mode of inquiry was applied – observation and experimentation. Galileo observed the characteristics of falling objects; he did not deduce them.

When in the seventeenth century, philosophy and science separated, the one turning to the analysis of experience, and the other to physical experiment, the way was made clear for a new problem to take shape."5 The question whether to abide with logic, pure and formal, or whether to trust experience, is the basis for the disagreement between two groups of philosophical theorists - Rationalists and Empiricists.

Joshua Whatmough very capably expresses the reason for abandoning Aristotelian logic:

In logic stability is achieved only at the cost of inhibiting change, which sooner or later will burst the bonds of any system of logic. This is the reason why the Aristotelian system, which had become completely rigid, is finally being abandoned under conditions which are totally different from those in which the system was framed and which it was intended to serve.

Bogoslovsky maintains that modern man does not think in terms of rational propositions of the Aristotelian type. Yet, as he points out, man has been eminently successful, particularly in the various branches of science and technology. This seems to lead to the obvious conclusion that, pragmatically at least, modern reasoning is superior to the traditional logic. And, indeed, this is the very conclusion that he does make, but he also adds that modern thinking is not without its shortcomings.

The characteristics of modern reasoning are listed as ". . . the constant inclination of concepts to trespass on their own borderlines, the dislike of definitions, and the tendency of sweeping statements." Further, modern thinking is described

Boris B. Bogoslovsky, The Technique of Controversy, Harcourt Brace, 1928, p.v.
 Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, The New American Library of World Literature, 1951, p. 25.
 Bogoslovsky, op. cit., p. 1.

 ⁴ Hector Hawton, Philosophy for Pleasure, Fawcett World Library, 1956, p. 29.
 ⁵ Ibid. p. 16.
 ⁶ Joshua Whatmough, Language, The New American Library, 1957, p. 72.

Bogoslovsky, op. cit., p. 10.

as being a method of inquiry, experimentation and creativity, often resulting in practical application of a discovery, adaptation or thought before it has been properly defined or classified. In reference to these characteristics Bogoslovsky states:8

Thus the whole analysis of the situation shows that modern thinking exhibits two rather contradictory characteristics: on the one hand, certain considerable shortcomings or even, from the standpoint of formal logic, fundamental defects; and, on the other hand, efficiency, decided creative power, and the intense satisfaction with which it is accepted by the modern mind.

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This apparent contradiction can be explained. Being relatively young, this new reasoning has not yet formalized a system or established adequate canons to control it; consequently it makes many mistakes. At times it attempts to use traditional logic, which is inappropriate, and, in general is haphazardly applied. This situation is expressly the one Bogoslovsky proposes to correct with the system of Dynamic Logic.

Bogoslovsky is certainly not the first or the only one who has been disturbed by the restrictions of a static logic. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming in Technique of Controversy is the seeming implication by the author that for more than two thousand years the rules of formal logic have been faithfully practiced by all philosophers and that he is the first to attempt a major revision of the system. "The ways of thinking described and formulated by Aristotle in his Organon . . . were used all through medieval times down to the present." If this means some of the rules were used by some thinkers some of the time, the statement certainly is correct. Otherwise it is obviously a gross overstatement.

Even before Aristotle, Heraclitus was sensitive to a world in flux. "You cannot step twice into the same river"; and he objected to a static philosophy. Hawton notes that, "By Plato's time attention was focused on the remarkable fact that the world of common-sense objects seemed utterly different from the picture that logic had painted."10

Aristotelian logic is based on several laws and postulates. These are known as the laws of excluded middle, of contradiction and of identity. Briefly these laws state that a given subject cannot both affirm and deny a given predicate, and, further, the subject must either affirm or deny a given predicate (i.e., the rose is either red or it is not red, but it cannot be both red and not-red at the same time). These are the laws which Bogoslovsky seeks to break.

Aristotle believed that concepts were ingredients of reality, that underlying all things was a bare "qualityless" matter, and that by adding qualities of various kinds and in varying degrees any object could be mentally constructed. Thus he held that new knowledge of the real world could be arrived at by a process of reasoning.

Hobbes and Locke rebelled against this kind of a system that implied innate or self-evident truths or axioms. Speaking of the esaays of Locke, Isaiah Berlin remarks, "The attack on innate ideas is . . . the greatest blow struck for empiricism and against the vast metaphysical constructions which rested on axioms for which no evidence could be discovered."11

David Hume, famous for his skepticism, directed a violent attack against induction, a priori reasoning, and the laws of thought. The law of identity (A=B), Hume points out, makes no sense unless B is exactly the same as A (the same rose, table or person) in which case A=A, and the law becomes an absurd tautology. Like Locke and Berkeley, Hume believes that knowledge derives from the senses. "There is no single phenomenon, even the most simple, which can be accounted for from the qualities of the objects as they appear to us, or which we could foresee without the help of memory and experience."12

In the following centuries the number of philosophers who rebelled against the restrictions of Aristotelian logic is even greater. Hegel's view in the Dialectic is that, "Being does not exclude notbeing in the formal sense that A excludes not-A. ¹³ Alfred North Whitehead, in Modes of Thought says. ". . . it [scientific reasoning] disregards all those mental antecedents which mankind habitually presuppose as effective in guiding cosmological functionings." And according to the interpretation Hawkins gives of Wittgenstein, ... the so-called laws of logic turn out to be tautologies."15

The above illustrations are intended to show that the step from Aristotle to what Bogoslovsky calls "modern thinking" is a big step and no one man can be thought of as bridging that gap. Theories like those contained in Technique of Controversy are but one link in an ever strengthening chain of dissatisfaction with an outmoded logical

TODAY'S SPEECH

<sup>Isaiah Berlin, The Age of Enlightenment, The New American Library, 1956, p. 40.
Ibida, p. 181. (citing Hume)
Hawton, op. cit., p. 106.
Morton White, The Age of Analysis, The American Library, 1956, p. 90. (citing Whitehead)
Hawton, op. cit., p. 159.</sup>

⁸ Ibid. p. 11. ⁹ Ibid., p. 72. ¹⁰ Hawton, **op. cit., p. 27.**

system. Mortimer J. Adler, in his review of this book for *Nation* expresses this point. "Mr. Bogoslovsky's treatise is a . . . presentation of a traditional uneasiness in philosophy that has culminated in Professor Dewey's type of pragmatism."¹⁶

Thus it becomes evident that the structure Bogoslovsky attempts to wreck has undergone a series of inevitable renovations.

III

Dynamic Logic as presented by Bogoslovsky is based on four principles. The first of these, the Principle of Polarity, states in essence, that any cognitive activity is based on contrast and differentiation: e.g., without warmth cold has no meaning. The second principle, called the Principle of the Partial Functioning of Concepts, is concerned with that process of thought which combines new experiences with previous experiences. This principle means that a new experience or concept enters the mind and "settles" somewhere between the poles of contrasted opposites (principle of polarity) at a distance inversely proportional to its likeness to each of them. Thus the concept of knife as a weapon might fall somewhere between bare fists and a revolver. But the concept of knife might also have as its opposite poles small knife and large knife, and in that case the "new" knife is placed between these two poles and nearest to the one it is most like. Any concept may form a pair of poles with an indefinite number of other concepts, but in any single case it functions in only one of its aspects.

The third principle deals with the growth of knowledge of a certain kind and is called the Principle of Continuity. This principle implies that the greater the number of concepts or experiences between any two poles, the stronger or "more continuous" will be the knowledge in this direction. To illustrate this principle, take the poles of temperature - freezing and boiling. Any one single experience with temperature, such as testing bath water, would be placed between freezing and boiling. As experiences with temperature increase - hot soup, cold beer, warm day, chilled wine, comfortable room - then the continuity between freezing and boiling is strengthened, and we can be more discriminative. "The essence of dynamic reasoning is the establishment of continuity between two opposite poles of a unit of thought, which tends to terminate in realization of their qualitative

The fourth principle, and the one which makes Dynamic Logic unique, is the *Principle of Quan-*

Mortimer J. Adler, "A New Logic," Nation, September 12, 1928.
 Bogoslovsky, op. cit., p. 16.

warm day is considered. If the poles are "very hot day" and "very cold day," then warm day fits somewhere between these two poles, the exact location depending on just how warm the day is. It would be difficult to communicate any kind of significant meaning concerning this particular warm day. The Principle of Quantitative Indices is concerned with the use of, and particularly the ability to communicate, our cognitive experiences. In order to do this, a quantitative index is established; and then, in the case of the warm day, the position will be determined by the use of available temperature measurements

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Of course if the concepts "mental activity" and "physical activity" are the opposite poles, and an activity such as driving a car is to be placed somewhere between these two poles to determine whether it is mostly physical or mostly mental, then the establishment of a quantitative index is a bit more involved. However, Bogoslovsky provides a system for doing just this. The system makes use of a number of separate subjective judgments by a jury (preferably of experts in the area involved). These judgments are then converted to numbers, and, after appropriate statistical treatment, they emerge as a rating scale or quantitative index.

These four principles, together with the underlying postulate, which Bogoslovsky terms the Law of Included Middle (A=B and non-B at the same time), form the basis of the system called Dynamic Logic

An example of this kind of reasoning can be given by using the color concepts of black and white. Instead of saying a certain piece of paper is absolutely black (or absolutely white) a continuum of colors including many shades of gray is constructed. The more shades of gray in this continuum, the stronger the continuity between black and white will be. A quantitative index must be formulated which will establish the percentage of blackness (or whiteness) of each of the shades of gray in the continuum between the black and white poles. Now the paper in question can be compared to this index and described as 40% black (or white), or 10% white (or black) etc. In the event that it is .9999 . . . % black (or white) this new logic is in agreement with classical logic. In any event the paper is both black and white simultaneously. Thus A=B and non-B at the same time.

IV

On the first page of *Technique of Controversy*, Bogoslovsky allows that there may be other reasons, besides an outmoded system of logic, responsible for some of the inefficiencies in reasoning.

But he ignores them in his enthusiasm to correct the methodology of logic. The point is that some of these other problems need to be resolved before the value of Dynamic Logic can be determined.

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If, for instance, perception itself is faulty and does not give us a true picture of the real world; if we actually do live in a world of "as if" instead of "as is," as Hans Vaihinger believes; or if we really do "define first and then see" as Walter Lippmann asserts, then no process of reasoning, no matter how skillfully it is constructed, can possibly vield true judgments consistently. The very blocks with which the logical structure is built may be

Bogoslovsky touches briefly on the conceptpercept controversy but resolves it simply by saying that no real separation between the two exists - that they are both always involved in the thinking process. This answer is not satisfactory. George Herbert Mead gives a great deal of attention to this matter and concludes that the thinking process consists of the mind paying attention to one of numerous external stimuli; then perception occurs in the light of a previously determined concept; and a new conceptualization takes place which also transforms the original concept.18 This seems to agree with Bogoslovsky's "merging of experience." As he puts it, the new (meaning most recent) experience is joined with the previous experience and the process transforms both.

It appears entirely possible, then, that the primary reason for faulty thinking is not a rigid structure of logical canons. Another possible cause lies in the area of language. The purpose of the fourth principle of Dynamic Logic is to render the outcome of reasoning communicable, and the stated purpose of the whole scheme is to enable man to control his environment. Susanne Langer states, however, that this is not the main function of language in society. The human speaks because he likes to speak. The viewpoint of Freud regarding the purpose of thinking is also contradictory to Bogoslovsky's environmental control purpose. Freud believed the ultimate purpose of thinking was to satisfy the total personality.

"Real thinking is possible only in the light of a genuine language,"10 says Miss Langer; and linguistic determinism as characterized by Whorf, and to a degree by Sapir — "Language is heuristic . . . in that it forms for us certain modes of observation and interpretation . . . "20 - is certainly not in agreement with Bogoslovsky's statement. ". . .

it is an almost universal conviction that the laws of thinking are nearly the same for all human beings and for all times."21 Indeed if language determines how we think, the concept of a universal system of logic is dependent on a universal

Bogoslovsky believes, as many others have, that because the methods employed in the physical sciences have been so eminently successful, these same methods should serve as a guide for developing a new logic. Miss Langer, regarding this very points, says, "One attempt after another has failed to apply the concept of causality to logic and aesthetics. . . . The scheme is not false – it is perfectly reasonable - but it is bootless for the study of mental phenomena."2

Some of the difficulty Bogoslovsky encounters is that while science is concerned with physically measurably things, logic is concerned with mental concepts. Adler, in his review, notes, ". . . they [pragmatists] should become aware of the exclusively different traits of ideas and things."28 William lames also allowed that such a difference exists, Thus amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the world of conceptions or things to be thought about stands stiff and immutable, like Plato's realm of ideas."24

Before forming any conclusions as to the applicability of Dynamic Logic, it seems desirable to summarize briefly the critique up to this point.

Bogoslovsky's rejection of Aristotelian logic seems to be warranted. Many scholars concur in this. "The limitations of Aristotelian logic have only begun to be fully realized.25 Secondly, these limitations were not suddenly realized, rather the need for new modes of reasoning became progressively more apparent. And, finally, it would seem that Bogoslovsky might well have given more attention to the process of thinking as viewed by anthropologists, linguists, psychologists, and sociologists be-before he attempted to formulate a set of canons for modern thought.

Technique of Controversy is, in many respects, a delightful and stimulating book. As one reads it he cannot help but be disturbed by the sorry state of affairs in much of our modern thinking. At the same time he is impressed by the earnest and somewhat novel attempt to correct the situation. But it seems, to borrow Miss Langer's phrase, that Dynamic Logic is "bootless for the study of mental phenomena.

Anselm Straus (editor), The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead, University of Chicago Press, 1956.
 Langer, op. cit., p. 63.
 İbid. p. 113 (citing Sapir)

²¹ Bogoslovsky, op. cit., p. 1. 22 Langer, op. cit. p. 32. 3 Adler, op. cit. 3 William James, Principles of Psychology. Holt, 1890, 1,462. 22 Hawton, op. cit., p. 30.

The conclusion is that, while it may have limited applications in the social sciences and in education, its general application to "all intelligent inquiry" must be rejected. The reasons for this rejection are: (1) Dynamic Logic does not apply to all kinds of thinking (Bogoslovsky notes this shortcoming in the final chapter); and (2) the scheme of quantitative indices, while it may have some merit, is in other respects highly impractical.

The first of these reasons can perhaps be illustrated by an analogy. Bogoslovsky's method of "finding" Dynamic Logic proceeds something like this:

1. The problem is to correct faulty thinking.

 Observation reveals that the best example of modern thinking is found is the realm of science. It is characterized by dynamism and continuity – just what we need.

3. Therefore Dynamic Logic shall be the meth-

for all reasoning.

Now imagine this same kind of a technique applied to a problem in transportation:

 The problem is to improve outmoded transportation.

2. Observation reveals that the airplane is the most modern. It is characterized by speed and comfort.

Therefore the airplane shall become the universal mode of transportation.

While this rules out traveling from Chicago to New York via stage coach as being too slow and uncomfortable, it also rules out a Sunday afternoon stroll in the park or a vacation cruise in a sailboat. Dynamic Logic does not take into account all the forms of purely contemplative thinking, "arm-chair philosophy," or reflections on love, friendship, and religion.

The system of quantitative indices has more serious shortcomings. As long as measurements exist the system has value and is, of course, widely used. In education it is certainly helpful to be able to measure the intelligence of a child and to compare the score with standard norms. But when a scale is set up by Bogoslovsky, to determine whether a given activity is mostly mental or physical (reading a book is 82.31% mental activity) and this scale is proposed as an index to be used on other boys reading other books, then the system is no longer plausible. The questions that must arise from such procedure are: What boy? What book? How interesting? The questions are endless. And yet for each valid question there would have to be another scale built. And if the boy lays down his book and picks up a violin or his fishing rod or

(Continued on page 34)

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Mind, Self and Society

by Robert Liebendorfer

An M. A. candidate at Penn State, Mr. Liebendorfer presents an analysis of a book that is of basic importance to all students of personality and of communication.

G EORGE MEAD'S ENDEAVOR to identify the role of speech, or the vocal gesture, in the development of the mind and self in a human society was an undertaking of great magnitude. The key to his theory was his belief that the individual act is seen within the social act.

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Mead's theory of mind and self development rests on the belief that "the individual act is seen within the social act"; but there is much within the theory that is not evident to casual observation. In order to acquaint oneself with the less evident, one must first recognize two specific facts about Mead's theory. One, Mead presupposes certain basic conditions: (a) "the pre-existence of the group," (b) "certain co-operative activities in which the different members of the group are involved,"2 (c) certain physiological endowments and capacities - vocal and auditory organs, central nervous system, cortex,3 and (d) the ability to take the role of the other.

The second fact the reader should know is that Mead is not only interested in the development of mind and self through society from a socio-psychological point of view but also from a philosophical point of view, specifically the view of a pragmatist. He is utilitarian; his concern is with results.

"Our contention is that mind can never find expression, and could never have come into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment; . . . Mind presupposes, and is a product of, the social process. The advantage of our view is that it enables us to give a detailed account and actually to explain the genesis and development of mind."

With Mead's presupposition boldly stated, one can immediately give a detailed account of the genesis and development of mind by beginning with a study of the gesture in its progress from automatic, immediate reaction to its status as the foundation of human speech. The gesture, to Mead,

is "a separable element . . . that is selected out by the sensitivities of other organisms (individuals) to it," and whose function "is to make adjustment possible among individuals."

Even though the gesture takes many forms in its early development, a pointed finger, a glance of the eye, a motion of the head, the individual eventually supplements these and depends mainly on the vocal gesture. It is the most stimulating, appealing and meaningful. "The vocal gesture, then, has an importance which no other gesture has. . . If we hear ourselves speak we are more apt to pay attention. . . . One is more apt to catch himself up and control himself in the vocal gesture than in the expression of the countenance" or of the body. "For Mead, the vocal gesture is the actual fountainhead of language proper and all derivative forms of symbolism; and so of mind."

Vocal gesturing in this stage of development is not speech because the vocal gestures are nonsignificant. To acquire significance the vocal gesture must "implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed."10

Having, now, the significant vocal gesture at his disposal, the individual can indicate to himself and to other individuals the response that he wants. This is mind." It is confined, generally, in Mead's writing, to the human individual because only the human has a significant vocal gesture, thus significant speech. "We mean by significant speech that the action is one that affects the individual himself, and that the effect upon the individual himself is part of the intelligent carrying-out of the conversation with others."12

Just as presupposition plays an important part in the development of mind, so it plays an important part in the development of the self. "The process out of which the self arises is a social process which implies interaction of individuals in the

¹ Mead, G. H., Mind. Self and Society, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1934 p. 164.

² Ibid., pp. 227-244

⁴ Ibid., pp. 150-164

⁵ Ibid., pp. 223-224

^a Ibid., p. 146 ⁷ Ibid., p. 47 ⁸ Ibid., p. 55 ⁹ Ibid., p. xxii ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 48 ¹¹ Ibid., pp. 131-133 ¹² Ibid., p. 141

group, implies the pre-existence of the group. It implies also certain cooperative activities in which the different members of the group are involved."18

Realizing that even the presuppositions did not answer all the questions about the full development of the self, Mead noted other specific activities that must take place before the self is fully developed (before it becomes an object to itself). These activities are the play, the game, and speech.

In play the self learns to assume one role after another in terms of the various actions that enter in playing. During this stage of specific role assumptions, the self learns that itself "is constituted simply by an organization of particular attitudes of other individuals . . . in specific social acts."

During the second stage of the full development of the self, the game, the self takes the role of not only one person but, instead, takes the role of all the persons engaged in a common social act. It is this taking of the role for all persons in a common social act that results in what Mead calls "the generalized other."

After passing through the developmental stages of the play and the game toward the full development of the self, the "I" and "me" appear. "The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes.

The other activity, in addition to the play and the game, that must take place before there is full development of the self is the activity of speech. "The importance of what we term 'communication' lies in the fact that it provides a form of behavior in which the organism or the individual may become an object to himself. It is that sort of communication which we have been discussing – in the sense of significant symbols . . . which is directed not only to others but also to the individual himself. So far as that type of communication is a part of behavior it at least introduces a self. Of course, one may hear without listening; one may see things that he does not realize; do things that he is not really aware of. But it is where one does respond to that which he addresses to another and where that response of his own becomes a part of his conduct, where he not only hears himself but responds to himself, talks and replies to himself as truly as the other person replies to him, that we have behavior in which the individuals become objects to themselves."16

"Given the self, there is then the possibility of the further development of the society on this self-conscious basis. . . . It is the self as such that

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The principle underlying "the possibility of the further development of the society" is "that of communication involving participation."18 . . . "This participation is made possible through the type of communication which the human animal is able to carry out $-\dots$ control of the response of the individual himself through taking the role of the

Very few men have been absolutely original in formulating a theory. This is true of Mead's theory of mind and self development. He built on a foundation constructed mainly by two psychologists, Wundt and Watson. They gave him basic ideas with regard to the importance of speech in the development of mind and self. Some of their ideas he accepted, others he discarded.

Mead's theory uses Wundt's "very valuable conception of the gesture," but waves aside the latter's conceptions of the role of gesture in speech by way of imitation or general instinct. There had been many studies in psychology, according to Mead, which pretty well discredited the explana-tion of imitation; therefore he rejected the explanation. "Imitation as the mere tendency on the part of an organism to reproduce what it sees or hears other organisms doing is mechanically impossible; one cannot conceive an organism as so constructed that all the sights and sounds which reach it would arouse in the organism tendencies to reproduce what it sees and hears in the field of

Another weakness closely aligned to Wundt's mistake of the role of the gesture in speech is the absence in his theory of the significant gesture."

Although these weaknesses of Wundt's caused Mead much disturbance, the disturbance was small

makes the distinctively human society possible. It is true that some sort of cooperative activity antedates the self. There must be some loose organization in which the different organisms work together, and that sort of cooperation in which the gesture of the individual may become a stimulus to himself of the same type as the stimulus to the other form, so that the conversation of gestures can pass over into the conduct of the individual. Such conditions are presupposed in the development of the self. But when the self has developed. then a basis is obtained for the development of a society which is different in its character from these (cattle and insects) other societies."

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 164 ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 158 ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 175 ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 138

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 239 18 Ibid., p. 253 19 Ibid., p. 253-254 20 Ibid., p. 42 21 Ibid., p. 60 21 Ibid., p. 60 22 Ibid., p. 48

compared with his feeling against Wundt's greatest weakness.23

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The difficulty is that Wundt presupposes selves as antecedent to the social process in order to explain communication within that process; whereas, on the contrary, selves must be accounted for in terms of the social process, and in terms of communication; and individuals must be brought into essential relation within that process before communication, or the contact between the minds of different individuals, becomes possible. The body is not a self, as such; it becomes a self only when it has developed a mind within the context of social experience. It does not occur to Wundt to account for the existence and development of selves and minds within, or in terms of, the social process of experience; and his presupposition of them as making possible that process, and communication within it, invalidates his analysis of that process. For if, as Wundt does, you presuppose the existence of mind at the start, as explaining or making possible the social . . . process of experience, then the origin of minds and the interaction among minds become mysteries. But if, on the other hand, you regard the social process of experience as prior (in a rudimentary form) to the existence of mind and explain the origin of minds in terms of the interaction among individuals within that process, then not only the origin of minds, but also the interaction among minds (which is thus seen to be internal to their very nature and presupposed by their existence or development at all) cease to seem mysterious or miraculous.

The other individual to whom Mead is somewhat indebted is John Watson. He realized Watson's concept of behaviorism as being important, but did not accept it wholly. Watson's version of behaviorism, in Mead's opinion, was too extreme, too mechanistic, dependent too much on data derived from the study only of animals. Consequently, even though a behaviorist, Mead's behaviorism did not reduce the world of experience to the visible, overt, and individual. "The point of approach I wish to suggest is that of dealing with experience from the standpoint of society." Mead, here, declares himself. He is a social behavorist, not an individual behaviorist.

Mead was also critical of Watson's concept of speech as merely "implicit laryngeal behavior." For Mead, speech is the highly developed and

objective expression of symbolic communication within a social group. It is a complex gesture situation, and even when internalized in thought, it remains social.

When Mind, Self and Society is compared with other works of contemporary scholars in the fields of social psychology on the development of self and mind through speech, a lack of any recent elaboration is noticed. The exception to this statement is the work of Walter Coutu, Emergent Human Nature. Even in this book, the author's purpose was not to look specifically at the development of mind and self through speech, but to "attempt to incorporate in a systematic manner the great contribution of George Herbert Mead."

The belief that some source of error may exist in role-taking is one major contribution of Coutu's. He believes that a person may have a false perception of another person which would result in taking a wrong attitude. Furthermore, the idea that a person takes the role of another person "for keeps" is eliminated by Coutu's observation that if this actually could happen everybody might think alike.

In the posthumous volume, Mind, Self and Society, much of what is presented about the relationship of speech to the development of mind, self, and society repeats what had already appeared in Mead's earlier writings. But this fact does not lessen the value of the book. For here Mead presents to the reader in greater detail the basic concepts which make up his theory. No doubt this greater detail has reduced arguments in accepting or rejecting Mead's theory from not understanding what he meant.

Among those who may most eagerly accept Mead's views are the people in the field of Speech. From his theory, if its presuppositions are accepted, one is literally driven to the realization that speech is the formative basis of mind, self, and society.

²⁶ Coutu, W., Emergent Human Nature, Alfred A. Knopf, 1949,

Language

Language can work wonders on land and sea through rousing enemies and mobs of men to action. Language is the mightiest of all instruments in its power to play upon human nature, to provoke men to climb to the stars or slink to obscurity. Words can kill as well as cure. Yet how little time we give to the perfection of this most potent of all tools and the one we use most. Besides, it is far easier to hurl an epithet than a brick at our enemy.

- George A. Dorsey. Man's Own Show: Civilization (1931) p. 44

Ibid., pp. 49-50
 Ibid., p. 1
 Watson, J. B., Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1929, p. 353

ONE MAN'S OPINION

(Continued from page 2)

It is always pleasant to report on the reprinting in other publications of articles that have appeared in TODAY'S SPEECH. In the December, 1959, issue of PUBLIC RELATIONS JOURNAL, Professor Harold P. Zelko's article, "Internal Communication and Public Relations," is reprinted from the November, 1958, issue of TODAY'S SPEECH. Dr. Ralph N. Schmidt's article, "Common Practices that Annoy Audiences," which appeared in our April, 1959, issue, has been republished in the July, 1959, issue of THE SAMPLE CASE, house organ of United Commercial Travelers. "Speech for the Secretary," by Professor William A. Behl, in our April, 1959, issue was abridged under the title, "Your Speech is Important," in the September, 1959, issue of THE SECRETARY, the official publication of the National Secretaries Association.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONALITY

(Continued from page 25)

to grow rapidly. The trend could not be stopped by this man's action alone.

In recommending a return to the relationships of the past, Allport apparently feared that some might misunderstand him, so he attempted to make his position clear;¹⁶

I am not one of those reactionaries who find solutions of all problems in a regression to the golden past. . . . While it is not necessary, in order to change one's direction, to turn completely backward, it is essential that we recall the values of the older family relationship which we are so ruthlessly destroying.

The reader is left somewhat confused as to a practical application of Allport's philosophy of institutionalism to society. Perhaps his is the situation as described by Arnold, in which an idealist cannot fit his principles into practical needs. Another statement made by Arnold could have been directed at Allport and at Lippman, since they both wrote their views during the great depression which followed the 1929 stock market crash:¹⁷

In each great depression the attack on industrial organizations is renewed, coupled with the demand that they be dissolved — a demand' which is always defeated because of the forces which make such organization essential.

 Allport, pp. 320-21.
 The Folklore of Capitalism, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, p. 216.

A CRITIQUE OF A TECHNIQUE

(Continued from page 30)

baseball bat — more scales must be built, and each of these scales requires a jury of people who are competent to judge these activities.

In any area where measurements do exist this system should be (and is) applied, and in areas where they don't exist efforts must be made to devise them (such efforts are being made). The kind of scales which Bogoslovsky proposes do not seem to be the answer.

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